TWN Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues (Jul26/04)
8 July 2026
Third World Network

Trade: "Flexible multilateralism" a threat to WTO's consensus principle?
Published in SUNS #10475 dated 3 July 2026

Geneva, 2 Jul (D. Ravi Kanth) -- The controversial World Trade Organization reform discussions focusing on "decision-making", "development",  "level playing field issues" and "foundational issues" have resumed, despite these very topics being firmly rejected by a large majority of developing and least-developed countries at the WTO's 14th ministerial conference (MC14) in Yaounde, Cameroon, earlier this year, said people familiar with the development.

Despite a glaring lack of consensus and an absence of a ministerial mandate from MC14, these discussions are seemingly being restarted with the expectation of yielding a different outcome amid the exact same material conditions, said people familiar with the development.

In fact, the reports from the Minister-Facilitators - contained in document WT/MIN(26)/39 issued on 2 April - appear to be framed on a balancing of "on the one hand and on the other hand" basis, said trade envoys of several countries.

The reports indicate that a large majority of countries vehemently opposed any changes to decision-making, foundational issues, development, level-playing field issues, and plurilateral initiatives.

Conversely, a small group of some 20-odd middle-income nations, otherwise known as the "Friends of the System", coordinated by Switzerland alongside major developed countries, sought fundamental changes to these issues, said trade envoys who asked not to be quoted.

To recall, the Norwegian Minister-Facilitator, Mr Espen Barth Eide, said "there was universal recognition that consensus is essential for inclusivity, legitimacy, and collective ownership of decisions and no Member suggested abandoning consensus-based decision-making."

The Minister-Facilitator pointed out that "many stressed the particular importance of consensus for developing and LDC Members as it ensures equality in decision-making regardless of Members' size or economic power."

However, he also noted somewhat obliquely that "at the same time, support was expressed for a more flexible decision-making approach based in consensus that would enable to deliver more outcomes."

Clearly, these two observations appear somewhat misleading and seem aimed at introducing "flexible consensus" in place of decision-making based strictly on "consensus" as enshrined in the Marrakesh Agreement.

It is suggested that "there was broad recognition of the need to honour existing mandates, particularly in agriculture and special and differential treatment (S&DT)."

Further, according to the Minister-Facilitator, "some Members emphasized the importance of stock-taking to assess what has been achieved and what remains outstanding", while "others drew a link between decision- making and past mandates, noting that unimplemented mandates fuel frustration and hinder progress."

The unfinished Doha issues - such as domestic farm subsidies and the permanent solution for public stockholding programs for food security in developing countries - had been scuttled by major industrialized countries after securing the Trade Facilitation Agreement at the WTO's ninth ministerial conference in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013.

It is public knowledge that these issues were supposed to be resolved at the WTO's 10th ministerial conference (MC10) in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 2015.

However, two major industrialized countries stated that they were not going to accept them, according to reports of the meeting.

Additionally, it was observed that "a view was expressed that only Ministers have the authority to discontinue mandates, and that mandates cannot be re-read, altered through reinterpretation or allowed to lapse implicitly."

Further, "it was suggested that the Ministerial Conference could establish a mechanism to clarify mandates without reopening them."

According to another Minister-Facilitator, "delegations affirmed consensus as a foundational principle and the cornerstone of the WTO, essential for legitimacy and inclusiveness, particularly for developing country Members, including LDCs".

"The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and Fisheries Subsidies Agreement were cited as proof that consensus could deliver meaningful results."

Yet, the same Minister-Facilitator observed that "at the same time, there was recognition by some that consensus should not be equated with unanimity or employed as a de facto veto in negotiation brinkmanship."

It was suggested that "misuse of the consensus could drive Members to conclude agreements outside the WTO, thereby weakening the multilateral system," even though the proponents of these WTO reforms have already seemingly struck a blow to the multilateral trading system through their reform proposals, said several trade envoys familiar with the development.

"There was also strong emphasis on the member-driven character of the Organization and on the practice of decision-making by consensus as a cornerstone for equitable participation and trust in the system. The discussion pointed to the importance of maintaining these principles as the basis for any future work."

In fact, the latest reform proposals by Argentina and Australia on changing the rules to seemingly push the plurilateral initiatives, as well as a non-paper unofficially tabled by Switzerland, titled "Delivering Through Flexible Multilateralism - A Contribution to the WTO Reform," indicate the same old issues that have been repeatedly rejected by a large majority of developing countries, said trade envoys who asked not to be quoted.

These proposals seem akin to "driving more nails in the WTO's coffin", according to trade envoys who preferred not to be quoted.

Even though the reform issues - "decision-making" facilitated by the Japanese trade envoy, "development" facilitated by the trade envoy from Botswana, "level playing field issues" facilitated by the Peruvian trade envoy, and "foundational issues" facilitated by the Malaysian trade envoy - remain on the table, many developing as well as least-developed countries seem far more focused on the mandated issues and the constant denial of the core developmental matters, said people familiar with the discussions.

Against this backdrop of a continued lack of consensus on WTO reform, as reflected time and time again in the reports, this appears to be a move to expect different results by repeating the same failed talks, said people familiar with the development.

SWISS NON-PAPER

The unofficial non-paper from Switzerland, titled, "Delivering Through Flexible Multilateralism - A Contribution to the WTO Reform", appears to be another attempt by the Friends of the System group at changing the decision-making process, among other proposals by some of its members, said trade envoys familiar with the development.

In an alleged attempt to stymie rules-based decision-making by consensus, the Swiss argue that "Decision- making has been identified as a priority area and an important starting point for WTO reform, as reflected in the report by Facilitator Petter Olberg dated 6 March 2026 (JOB/GC/491)."

However, there was no consensus on the controversial facilitator Ambassador Olberg's process. In fact, several questions were raised regarding how he seemingly constructed allegedly biased reports, said a trade envoy who asked not to be quoted.

The Swiss reference "flexible multilateralism," a concept that has been sharply rejected at every stage. Just because it was mentioned in his report does not apparently lend it any credence, the trade envoy added.

In a seemingly convoluted argument, the Swiss say that "although closely linked to decision-making, the notion of flexible multilateralism is not limited to that specific aspect of WTO governance and does not seek to challenge the practice of consensus."

If it does not seek to challenge "the practice of consensus", then why introduce this proposal, the trade envoy asked.

According to the Swiss non-paper, "flexibility should be understood as a way to strengthen the multilateral trading system by enabling the WTO to be more effective, dynamic, and responsive to Members' expectations and current challenges, including through different forms of plurilateral agreements as proposed in Members' written submissions since December 2025."

In effect, the Swiss paper is primarily aimed at promoting plurilateral negotiations that are known to be the least beneficial for the majority of developing and least-developed countries, said another trade envoy.

It seeks to drive another proverbial nail into the WTO's Marrakesh Agreement, which established a member- driven, rules-based, multilateral trading order.

While the Swiss maintain that "flexibility, guided by clearly defined parameters could also be useful in taking into account the respective needs of Members, particularly developing Members," developing countries are not asking for new agreements.

Instead, they are demanding the conclusion of the unfinished Doha negotiations in agriculture - particularly the reform of domestic farm subsidies that is being opposed by the G10 farm-protectionist countries like Norway, Switzerland, and Japan, among others - said a developing country proponent of WTO reform who asked not to be quoted.

The purpose of this non-paper is stated as an attempt "to present concrete ideas and examples of how flexibility could enable the system to deliver while preserving the WTO's core values and principles."

Essentially, however, the Swiss non-paper represents a demand by the Friends of the System group and its major developed-country allies, said an African trade envoy.

GUIDING  PARAMETERS

The Swiss non-paper suggested that "moving towards greater flexibility, certain guiding parameters should be respected."

It elaborated on the guiding parameters based "on the WTO's fundamental values and rules."

According to the unofficial non-paper, "the following guiding parameters would serve as safeguards:

1. Trade positive agenda: Flexibility should not lead to the imposition of additional trade restrictions. It should facilitate greater trade liberalization through rule-making among those Members that are ready.

2. Preserving consensus: Flexibility is not meant to undermine the practice of consensus - which remains a central feature of WTO decision-making - but rather to support the building of consensus, including by helping overcome obstacles to decision-making.

3. Open door policy: Flexibility to allow any interested Member to join the initiatives.

4. Inclusion: Increased flexibility must also take into account the needs of developing and LDC Members.

5. Variable geometry: Flexibility for different initiatives to have different configuration of Members, which can also move at different pace.

6. Transparency: All Members must be informed of the process, substance and key developments of any relevant initiatives."

Further, it seemingly proposes "concrete ideas on flexible multilateralism."

It suggests that "flexibility could add value in a variety of areas," arguing that "the ideas presented below are meant as a basis for discussion."

It maintains that "these ideas are not exhaustive and should be seen as part of an ongoing discussion on flexible multilateralism."

They include:

1. Flexible instruments: Under this approach, "formal decisions, which are generally legally binding, are the default form of decision-making by the Ministerial Conference or the General Council. However, nothing prevents the Ministerial Conference or the General Council from adopting more flexible instruments, such as best practices, guidelines or recommendations to be implemented by Members on a voluntary basis. Where appropriate, the relevant committees could monitor the application of such instruments. One example is the Guidelines on Conformity Assessment Procedures adopted by the TBT Committee on 13-15 March 2024 (G/TBT/54)."

2. Flexible pace: This would include "Opt-in and opt-out clauses in future agreements or decisions [that] would recognize that a single implementation timetable may not be suitable for all Members, and that differentiated commitments may be necessary to take into account the specific situation of Members, particularly developing Members."

This sounds much like the GATT Tokyo Round codes, which would imply regressing to the old GATT arrangements rather than adhering to the binding WTO rules.

3. Flexible platforms: "There is today a growing gap between the multilateral context and the bilateral or plurilateral context, in which new disciplines are negotiated and new types of agreements are concluded (e.g. digital agreements, green economy agreements, critical minerals agreements). Appropriate thematic platforms - in addition to the regular work of the committees - could be established in order to learn from these initiatives and enable relevant experiences to inform multilateral discussions."

4. Flexible Processes: "Decisions in the WTO are taken by consensus. In practice, this approach gives any Member the ability to prevent the adoption of a decision, even if its economic interests are not affected by a proposed decision and even when that Member would have no obligation to implement it."

In effect, the Swiss non-paper seems to suggest jettisoning the practice of consensus-based decision-making, said a former General Council chair from Africa.

The non-paper suggests that "flexible approach to consensus-building, based on the concept of Pareto improvement, could be an understanding or agreement among Members not to block the adoption of a decision, where (i) their economic interests are not affected by that decision and (ii) they would have no obligation to implement the instrument in question."

In conclusion, the Swiss non-paper states that "the ideas presented in this non-paper are intended to stimulate discussion on concrete steps that could be taken to advance WTO reform and could be further developed in appropriate formats. Structuring the discussions around the different forms of flexibility identified above could in particular support constructive discussions at MC14 and help generate pragmatic and concrete outcomes."

An objective analysis of these ideas, according to several trade envoys, reveals an intent to jettison consensus- based decision-making in order to promote plurilateral negotiations driven by the interests of powerful countries.

Meanwhile, the developing and least-developed countries would be reduced to being mere bystanders and passive takers of decisions made by the former. +