|
||
|
TWN
Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues (Dec25/07) Geneva, 2 Dec (D. Ravi Kanth) — As the facilitator overseeing the discussions on the controversial reform of the World Trade Organization begins his meetings with the first group of members on 2 December, there is mounting concern among developing countries that their development-oriented agenda is being sidelined to advance the interests of major industrialized countries, according to people familiar with the discussions. Last week, the chair of the WTO’s General Council (GC) convened a meeting with the chairs of the regular WTO bodies – not the Doha negotiating bodies – to seek their input for the outcome for the upcoming WTO’s 14th ministerial conference (MC14) in Yaounde, Cameroon in March 2026, said a trade envoy, who asked not to be quoted. The question posed by GC chair, Ambassador Saqer Abdullah Almoqbel of Saudi Arabia, reportedly surprised the chairs of the regular WTO bodies, whose task is to oversee the implementation of the WTO agreements, not negotiating them. Some chairs asked how they could contribute to MC14, a question the GC chair apparently could not answer, the envoy said. Another trade envoy, who also requested anonymity, noted that the reform facilitator, Ambassador Petter Olberg of Norway, was present at this meeting, which raised doubts about the process. In separate meetings with the chairs and several key members, WTO Director-General Ms. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala apparently suggested that MC14 is “her meeting and she can’t let it be spoiled,” according to a trade envoy who was present. People familiar with the closed-door small-group meetings said that there is still no substantial discussion on how to curb unilateral tariffs, which have become commonplace, or on other mandated issues in the WTO reform process. Analysts familiar with WTO trade data find the DG’s frequent refrain that the US administration’s reciprocal tariffs have not markedly dented global trade flows (under MFN terms) – which she said have fallen from 80 percent to about 72 percent – somewhat confusing. They note that this figure does not capture agriculture, intellectual property royalties, and several other trade flows. This comes as US President Donald Trump declared on his Truth Social media website last week: “Tariffs have made our Country Rich, Strong, Powerful, and Safe.” Alleging that tariffs “have been successfully used by other Countries against us for Decades,” President Trump said: “but when it comes to Tariffs, and because of what I have set in place, WE HAVE ALL THE CARDS, and with a smart President, we always will! Wars have been stopped, and stronger relationships with other countries have been built, even though they are not allowed to rip off the United States anymore.” Several WTO members are reportedly being severely affected by the US reciprocal tariffs. Yet, trade envoys pointed out that there is no discussion in the WTO reform talks on how to curb the allegedly WTO-inconsistent unilateral tariffs. Similarly, the fundamental issue of reforming the dispute settlement system has been separated from the broader WTO reform discussions, in an apparent move to link the two issues at MC14, according to sources. FACILITATOR’S EMAIL In an email sent to Heads of Delegation last week, the WTO reform facilitator, Ambassador Olberg, announced that he would hold discussions from 2 December onwards in four groups of members, terming 2-5 December as the “Reform Week.” “The purpose of this week (starting from 2 December) is to provide all Members with an opportunity to refine the elements that could be presented to Ministers for their consideration at MC14,” he wrote. However, he did not explain how he would handle the unbridgeable differences – for instance, if powerful members like the United States insist that no recommendations should be sent to MC14, said people familiar with the discussions. According to sources, the US has stated during a small-group discussion on “decision-making” that no related proposals should be forwarded to ministers at MC14. The US has also made it clear that nothing on cotton should be sent to Cameroon merely because the meeting is in Africa. Furthermore, the US appears disinclined toward having an outcome document, according to a source who asked not to be quoted. Several trade envoys criticized the facilitator’s agenda for conflating three issues – changing the consensus principle, differentiating on treaty-based special and differential treatment, and “leveling the playing field” – while failing to address the core issues of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The facilitator did not mention the Doha Work Program in his email, even though the current Doha Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) and General Council operate under the 2002 General Council decision. Unless a ministerial conference or the General Council formally declares the Doha Round of trade negotiations permanently terminated, the facilitator is seemingly mandated to adhere to the Doha Work Program, sources noted. Trade envoys also pointed out that the facilitator audaciously cited the Uruguay Round rules – particularly those in the Marrakesh Agreement – which he now seeks to change through a rather convoluted process. A South American trade official described the facilitator’s reform discussions as “nothing but smoke and mirrors, lacking credibility.” Many envoys added that a large majority of members are being kept in the dark, with the facilitator having held discussions with only about 20 countries on the three key issues. One envoy said the facilitator’s suggestions are largely made under his own responsibility and presented as a fait accompli, undermining their credibility. MEETINGS & PROCESS CONCERNS The facilitator divided the WTO’s 166 members into four groups meeting sequentially but did not explain the criteria for the groupings. Several developing countries view this plan as a “divide and rule” framework meant to scatter the opponents. Group One (meeting on 2 December) comprises: Armenia; Argentina; Benin; Botswana; Burundi; Cabo Verde; Chile; Cuba; Democratic Republic of Congo; Eswatini; Gabon; Ghana; Grenada; Guinea-Bissau; Hong Kong, China; Jordan; Lao PDR; Madagascar; Malawi; Mauritania; Myanmar; Namibia; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Qatar; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saint Lucia; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands; Suriname; Chinese Taipei; Tanzania; Timor-Leste; Togo; and Tonga. Group Two (meeting on 3 December) comprises: Angola; Belgium; Bolivia; Brazil; Albania; Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Comoros; Congo; Cote d’Ivoire; Croatia; Czech Republic; Dominica; Estonia; European Union; Fiji; The Gambia; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Iceland; Indonesia; Ireland; Kenya; Republic of Korea; The State of Kuwait; Latvia; Liberia; Liechtenstein; Luxembourg; Republic of Moldova; The Netherlands; New Zealand; Niger; North Macedonia; Peru; Poland; Senegal; Slovak Republic; South Africa; Spain; and Ukraine. Group Three (meeting on 4 December) comprises: Antigua and Barbuda; Austria; Kingdom of Bahrain; Bangladesh; Canada; Chad; China; Colombia; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Egypt; France; Germany; Haiti; Honduras; Israel; Jamaica; Kazakhstan; Lesotho; Malaysia; Mexico; Mongolia; Mozambique; Panama; Paraguay; Philippines; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Samoa; Sweden; Switzerland; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkiye; Uganda; United Arab Emirates; United States; Uruguay; Vanuatu; Viet Nam; and Zambia. Group Four (meeting on 5 December) comprises: Afghanistan; Australia; Barbados; Belize; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Costa Rica; Cyprus; Ecuador; El Salvador; Finland; Georgia; Guyana; Hungary; India; Italy; Japan; Kyrgyz Republic; Lithuania; Macao, China; Maldives; Mali; Malta; Mauritius; Montenegro; Morocco; Nepal; Oman; Papua New Guinea; Portugal; Romania; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Singapore; Slovenia; Sri Lanka; Tajikistan; Thailand; United Kingdom; Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and Zimbabwe. An African ambassador, who preferred not to be quoted, concluded: “This bears no resemblance to the process Ministers mandated at MC12. A member-driven exercise has quietly morphed into a facilitator-scripted production with no grounding in the instructions the Membership actually agreed. This choreography would allow the DG and Facilitator to tell Ministers that reform has been “discussed”, when in reality most Members have been spectators to a process they were never meaningfully part of.” +
|
||
