BACK TO MAIN  |  ONLINE BOOKSTORE  |  HOW TO ORDER

TWN Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues (Feb24/10)
16 February 2024
Third World Network


WTO: Chair under pressure to withdraw option on PSH at MC13
Published in SUNS #9945 dated 14 February 2024

Geneva, 13 Feb (D. Ravi Kanth) — With little time left for the World Trade Organization’s 13th ministerial conference (MC13) that begins in Abu Dhabi from 26 February, the chair of the Doha agriculture negotiations, Ambassador Alparslan Acarsoy of Turkiye, appears to have created some confusion when he suggested whether the ongoing Geneva process to finalize the draft text should be sent to ministers or not, said people familiar with the discussions.

As he started the “streamlining” discussions on domestic support and market access on 12 February, the chair’s opening statement on whether to send a text to the ministers or not seemingly caused a minor flutter, said people familiar with the discussions.

It appears that the chair has come under pressure from unknown quarters, said people familiar with the discussions.

Nevertheless, the discussions on 12 February seemingly focused on how to lessen the options to make it simple in three or four paragraphs, said people familiar with the discussions.

Australia, which is the coordinator of the Cairns Group of farm-exporting countries, appears to have asked for time to make an effort to streamline the language.

Australia is coordinating discussions among a small group of countries every day before the chair’s discussions with all members, said people, who asked not to be quoted.

DOMESTIC SUPPORT

During the “streamlining” discussions on domestic support, divergences came into the open between Cairns Group members on the one side, and the G10 group of farm-defensive countries on the other, said people who asked not to be quoted.

The G10, including Norway, appears to have expressed their concern on proposals for addressing final bound total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), including the elimination of FBT AMS, said people who asked not to be quoted.

To allay the fears expressed by the G10 countries on domestic support, Colombia suggested capping and time- lines, said people who asked not to be quoted.

MARKET ACCESS

On market access, tensions surfaced between the Cairns Group members, particularly Paraguay, on the one side, and the European Union on the other, said people who asked not to be quoted.

While the EU asked for a non-exhaustive general proposal on market access, Paraguay called for a clear list of items for discussions to finalize modalities by MC14, said people who asked not to be quoted.

In the chair’s draft text, two differing elements are proposed in paragraphs 13 and 14. The elements are as follows:

13. Members commit to pursue and intensify the negotiations on agricultural market access to improve substantially and progressively market access opportunities for all Members and strengthen disciplines in accordance with the reform objective in the AoA, within a reasonable timeframe to be agreed by Members. [Modalities shall be agreed and adopted by MC14/Members agree to work towards achieving modalities by MC14.]

14. These negotiations may address tariff reductions and other elements such as tariff simplification, tariff escalation, high tariffs and tariff peaks, transparency in changes of applied tariffs, tariff rate quotas, and special agricultural safeguards, and take into account the interests of both importing and exporting Members. Technical discussions on relevant market access elements shall support these negotiations, as necessary, to facilitate effective participation by all Members and a common understanding on the elements to be addressed in negotiations.

STATUS REPORT

In a report on the state of play, Ambassador Acarsoy has laid out the issues in domestic support, market access, special safeguard mechanism (SSM), export restrictions, export competition, cotton, public stockholding for food security purposes (PSH) and food security and cross-cutting issues following intense discussions on each item last week.

Though things appear pretty calm on the surface, the tensions and the undercurrents beneath the surface seem pretty daunting due to continued differences on almost all issues, according to the 11-page status report.

In the introduction to the restricted report (TN/AG/58), the chair says that “trade acts as a conveyor belt transporting food from surplus to deficit areas”, and “the value of agricultural trade has increased significantly from around USD 300 billion in 1995 to USD 1.5 trillion in 2022.”

Yet, WTO “Members still see the need to update global agricultural trade rules to further the much-valued agricultural reform process, which commenced in 1995 with the entry into force of the AoA, following grand collective efforts by Members in the Uruguay Round.”

The need for an urgent update of rules set out in the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, the chair says, “is essential to achieve the advancements and refinements in the AoA that WTO Members have been awaiting since negotiations began nearly 25 years ago, and to enable the sector to address contemporary challenges facing the agricultural sector more effectively.”

Without mentioning the Doha agriculture negotiations that set important parameters till 2008, when the negotiations were allegedly held hostage by the powerful farm lobbies in one of the major industrialized countries, the chair merely notes that “regrettably, Members have struggled to fulfill in its entirety the mandate set out in Article 20 of the AoA, as well as other relevant Ministerial mandates.”

Ambassador Acarsoy noted that “with the exception of a few outcomes, including those on Public Stockholding and the administration of Tariff Rate Quotas at the Ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali in 2013, and on Export Competition at the Tenth Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in 2015, there has not been any substantive outcome in the agriculture negotiations since they were launched in 2000.”

He said, “Notwithstanding the food security outcomes at the Twelfth Ministerial Conference (MC12) (held in Geneva in June 2022) , it is also notable that there was no decision on any of the core negotiating agricultural issues at the last two Ministerial Conferences.”

The chair said that ever since he took over as the chair of the Doha agriculture negotiations in January 2023, “I have held numerous consultations with Members in various configurations, as well as many meetings of the CoA-SS and the Dedicated Sessions on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes (PSH) and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) with the view to making progress in the negotiations.”

The special sessions held on mandated issues and other issues deepen “understanding of the issues and facilitate greater appreciation of the positions of different Members on the negotiating issues.”

Ambassador Acarsoy, who faced some difficult moments in the informal negotiations, particularly in one-on-one meetings with select countries where one member seemingly behaved un-diplomatically, said he “encouraged evidence-based negotiations by organizing focused seminars and discussions on several critical negotiating issues – PSH, domestic support, market access and export restrictions – as well as on food security, which is a cross- cutting topic of paramount importance to the Membership.”

The chair acknowledged that despite intense engagements at the political level, “they did not succeed in changing Members’ fundamental positions on the negotiating issues.”

“This was very much the case for the two most contentious issues, namely PSH and domestic support,” the chair said, adding that “whereas PSH proponents insist on the adoption of a permanent solution, mandated to be agreed and adopted already by MC11 in 2017, others – particularly exporting Members – believe that PSH should be addressed within the ambit of the overall domestic support negotiations considering the intricate proximity of issues involved in the otherwise separately conducted negotiations on the two topics.”

The obdurate stance adopted by the opponents of PSH is “contested by the PSH proponents who insist that PSH was collectively agreed by the Membership at the highest level to be put on a separate track distinct from the agriculture negotiations, and that there is no basis for proposing later to link it to the domestic support negotiations.”

More importantly, “for some PSH proponents, it is the lack of political will which is preventing the resolution of this issue, as commendable technical work has been done over the years,” the chair noted.

Interestingly, the opponents of the mandated and stand-alone issue of PSH like the US and the members of the Cairns Group of farm-exporting countries continue to maintain that “the PSH issue cannot be resolved in isolation from other issues in the domestic support negotiations, and that a holistic approach is needed to ensure balanced outcomes and politically acceptable trade-offs for all.”

For the US and the members of the Cairns Group, as well as farm-defensive countries like the EU and Japan, “all the negotiating issues should be addressed concurrently, and priority should not be given to addressing one issue at the expense of the others.”

The tensions between the US and Paraguay, which seems to have become the new leader of the Cairns Group, on domestic support and market access came into the open when Paraguay seemingly suggested that some members like Switzerland re derailing the negotiations, said people familiar with the discussions.

In his report, the chair said, “The negotiations on domestic support have also been very contentious.”

“Whereas all Members agree on the need to reduce trade-distorting support, there are disagreements on some fundamental negotiating elements, including the starting point and the scope of support to be reduced/ disciplined,” he said in the report.

Further, “While linkages are usually natural in any multi-topic negotiations, for progress to be made in the agriculture negotiations, it is imperative that solutions should be found to these two overarching issues if the current stalemate is to be broken.”

The report, according to the chair, “does not purport to be a consensus document or exhaustively reflect all the positions advocated by Members on the various issues under negotiation.”

“From my perspective as Chair, this stocktaking is intended first to acknowledge the substantive work undertaken so far by Members, as reflected in the non-exhaustive list of submissions annexed to this report, and to build on that body of work, as negotiations continue after MC13,” he said.

DOMESTIC SUPPORT

According to the report, “domestic support has been at the heart of agricultural negotiations since they began in 2000 and continues to be a top priority for the vast majority of Members, considering that Members’ entitlements amount to nearly USD 1 trillion”, which could further double in 2030 if nothing is done to stem the upward trend as a result of increased production and prices of major staple products.

In its 2023 publication, the OECD estimates that, between 2020 and 2022, countries provided around USD 630 billion per year in support to individual producers. Over the years, negotiations in this area have been strongly influenced by the evolution of the level of support actually provided by Members.

“All Members agree on the need to discipline further trade-distorting domestic support. However, wide divergences remain among Members on what constitutes “trade-distorting” domestic support – is it all Article 6 (of the Agreement on Agriculture) support or some sub-categories; and on the degree of distortion caused by these different subcategories.”

Also, there is “the issue of how trade-distorting domestic support should be reduced – should all categories be addressed concurrently, or should certain categories be given priority?”

The report maintains that: “Whereas some Members would like to address all support under Article 6, including support provided under Articles 6.2 and 6.5 of the AoA on the grounds that all subcategories are trade-distorting, some Members would like to see support which exceeds de minimis thresholds addressed first (i.e., the issue of sequencing), deeming it the most trade distorting.”

However, “most developing Members have argued for the exemption of support provided under Article 6.2 from any new disciplines, considering especially that the support to low-income or resource-poor farmers does not have the potential to distort international trade.”

For the past eight years, ever since the former US trade envoy to the WTO Ambassador Michael Punke called for reduction commitments in Article 6.2 of the AoA, which is considered as a “development box” by developing countries for their agriculture, the US, the Cairns Group countries, the EU, and Japan seem to have coalesced in calling for reduction commitments in Article 6.2, said farm trade negotiators, who asked not to be identified.

GREEN BOX SUBSIDIES

On the hundreds of billions of dollars in “green box” subsidies provided by the industrialized countries, especially the US, “some WTO Members also consider that Green Box support (under Annex 2 of the AoA) ought to be addressed to ensure it causes no more than minimal trade distortion.”

“Some have also suggested that Green Box disciplines might need to be reviewed to ensure that contemporary challenges, such as food security, rural livelihood security, and environmental protection, can be more effectively addressed. Several Members consider that the shift to the use of non-trade-distorting or minimally trade- distorting support should be encouraged and that the focus in the negotiations should be more on disciplining trade-distorting domestic support,” the report noted.+

 


BACK TO MAIN  |  ONLINE BOOKSTORE  |  HOW TO ORDER