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TWN
Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues (Dec20/15) Geneva, 14 Dec (D. Ravi Kanth) – In the absence of an agreement on fisheries subsidies, the developed countries along with several developing countries have stepped up their efforts to force a General Council (GC) decision on export prohibitions at the World Trade Organization under the apparent pretext of supporting the World Food Programme (WFP) during the COVID-19 pandemic, trade envoys told the SUNS. The decision is aimed ostensibly at conveying a message that the WTO is capable of delivering a decision, while, at the same time, ensuring that the developed country sponsors of the decision seek to issue another message that they are more eager to project their work on the controversial plurilateral Joint Statement Initiatives (JSI) on electronic commerce, investment facilitation, services domestic regulation, and disciplines for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). It is an open secret that the JSIs have undermined the multilateral arm of the WTO, said a trade envoy, who asked not to be quoted. At a time when the developing countries are seeking a multilateral waiver for suspending the implementation of crucial obligations under the TRIPS Agreement concerning copyrights, patents, industrial designs, and protection of undisclosed information, in combating the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Union and Canada along with other members of the Ottawa Group are pressing for Joint Statement Initiative negotiations on trade and health, said another trade envoy, who asked not to be quoted. The sponsors of the GC decision on export prohibitions include the United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Liechtenstein, and developing countries such as Albania, Angola, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Grenada, Guyana, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, and Chinese Taipei among others. The sponsors proposed that “in view of the critical humanitarian support provided by the World Food Programme, made more urgent in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises,” the General Council decides that “members shall not impose export prohibitions or restrictions on foodstuffs purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Programme.” At a meeting of 15 trade envoys convened by the chair of the Doha agriculture negotiations, Ambassador Gloria Abraham Peralta from Costa Rica, sharp differences came to the fore between Singapore, which is spearheading the proposed GC decision, on the one side, and India and Pakistan on the other over attempts to rush to a decision on export prohibitions while ignoring the permanent solution on public stockholding programs for food security and other major issues of the Doha work program, said a person familiar with the meeting. At the Heads of Delegation (HoD) meeting, India apparently argued that it has had long-standing cooperation with the WFP’s humanitarian efforts and reiterated its difficulty in accepting a blanket exemption for WFP purchases from export restrictions at this juncture, the person suggested. Stating that due to its own food security considerations, India suggested that food security cannot be addressed through the prism of international trade alone, and that not only the causes but the symptoms of hunger should also be addressed, said another person, who preferred not to be quoted. The real problem of hunger lay with access to food, requiring structural reforms and an extension of the Bali decision on new Public Stockholding programs should be a deliverable in this context, India suggested, according to the person. According to a recent study by the WFP and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the negative impact of COVID-19 related restrictions on blue-collar workers’ international migration and the remittance of their incomes had adversely affected livelihoods and food security. Therefore, the structural reform that is much needed is a reduction of various remittance fees and restrictions on international migration. Singapore apparently objected to India’s arguments at that meeting, suggesting that India is adopting an obstructive stance, the person said. In a sharp response, India criticized Singapore for its remarks at the HoD meeting, the person said, preferring not to be quoted. Singapore issued a communication on 4 December (WT/GC/W/811) that said that WFP estimates that the number of acute food insecure people in its countries of operation could also increase to 270 million before the end of the year, representing an 82 percent increase from pre-COVID-19 food insecurity levels. In that communication, Singapore argued that “export restrictions put in place by some countries affect the WFP’s life-saving work, by ultimately eroding the value of its humanitarian assistance.” Some examples highlighted by the WFP, according to Singapore, are: i. Delays and, in some cases, cancellation of procurement contracts to support vulnerable people; ii. Increased risk of food waste and losses due to longer transportation times and changes to the supply chain; iii. Delays in the delivery of life-saving food to beneficiaries; and iv. Higher procurement, transportation and distribution costs. As WFP is a voluntary-funded organization, more money spent on administration means less food for the beneficiaries. Singapore argued that the proposal on export prohibitions or restrictions relating to the WFP “will help support the 690 million hungry people in the world today to achieve (the United Nations) SDG (Sustainable Development Goal) 2 on zero hunger by boosting WFP’s capacity to deliver humanitarian assistance and allow more lives to be saved, while in no circumstances jeopardize the food security of the country where food commodities are sourced.” “We understand that the proposal is not the panacea for eradicating hunger, but it is an important step forward,” Singapore concluded. At the end of the day, the WFP is working bilaterally and enters into contracts with countries bilaterally and without any discussions, suggesting that there is no need for a multilateral decision at this juncture, said a trade envoy, who asked not to be quoted. FAILURE TO CONCLUDE A FISHERIES SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT The chair of the Doha fisheries subsidies negotiations, Ambassador Santiago Wills from Colombia, on 14 December conceded that there will not be any agreement on fisheries subsidies, informing members that he will issue a revised draft text at the General Council meeting on 16-17 December, said a person who asked not to be quoted. In what appears to be largely due to the alleged “top-down and intimidatory” approaches adopted by the chair of the Doha Rules negotiating body, Ambassador Santiago Wills from Colombia, the negotiations failed to yield an agreement in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14.6, said several trade envoys, who asked not to be quoted. Controversial approaches, including apparent special carve-outs in the disciplines to the major subsidizers for tackling overcapacity and overfishing (OC&OF), and also growing distrust have led to an impasse, said trade envoys, who preferred not to be quoted. In all probability, the next target for concluding the fisheries subsidies negotiations is going to be the WTO’s 12th ministerial conference (MC12) in Nur Sultan, Kazakhstan, in June 2021. Under the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14.6, WTO members were mandated to conclude an agreement, by 2020, to “prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, and eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing, and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiation”. Instead of adopting a bottom-up approach and allowing members to negotiate the appropriate disciplines through a give-and-take approach, the chair, Ambassador Wills, has apparently converted the negotiations as one between him and the members, over the imbalanced text that largely benefited the major subsidizers that caused overfishing through their huge fleets of fishing boats/vessels, said several trade envoys, who asked not to be quoted. Indeed, the chair acknowledged at the end of the HoD meeting on 2 December that he may not be in a position to wish members a Happy Christmas and New Year as he planned to do so, because of the impasse in the negotiations, said a developing country trade envoy, who asked not to be quoted. Many developing countries expressed sharp concerns over the text and the questions on special and differential treatment and overcapacity and overfishing, implying that it is unlikely to have an agreement, said a trade envoy, who asked not to be quoted. But trade envoys from several industrialized countries, particularly members of the so-called Ottawa Group led by Canada, have praised the chair for his approaches and determination to conclude the negotiations by the end of this month. They did not find any fault with the revised draft consolidated text, nor the questions the Chair had circulated for ensuring sustainability, according to the statements issued by some of the members of the Ottawa Group at meetings. During the last phase of negotiations early this month, as well as last month, the chair’s text as well as the questions by the chair on the “sustainability” argument and disciplines for prohibiting subsidies for overcapacity and overfishing (OC&OF) that seemed to benefit the major subsidizers – China, the European Union, the United States, Japan, Korea, and Chinese Taipei among others – caused a huge storm, the trade envoy suggested. Even prior to the 2 December meeting, sharp exchanges came to the fore between the chair and his facilitator on special and differential treatment, Ambassador Didier Chambovey from Switzerland, on the one side, and several developing countries on the other over special and differential treatment and the needs-based approach, suggested a developing country negotiator, who preferred not to be identified.
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