TWN
Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues (Feb18/03)
2 February 2018
Third World Network
EU's AD duties on biodiesel from Indonesia held WTO-illegal
Published in SUNS #8609 dated 29 January 2018
Geneva, 26 Jan (Kanaga Raja) - A dispute panel at the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) has largely ruled that anti-dumping (AD) measures
imposed by the European Union on imports of biodiesel from Indonesia
were inconsistent with the EU's obligations under the WTO.
In the ruling (WT/DS480/R) issued on 25 January, the panel concluded
that, to the extent that the EU measures at issue are inconsistent
with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994, they have nullified
or impaired benefits accruing to Indonesia under these agreements.
Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU),
the panel recommended that the European Union bring its measures into
conformity with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
the GATT 1994.
It noted that Indonesia has requested that the panel use its discretion
under the second sentence of the same article to suggest ways in which
the European Union should bring its measures into conformity with
the Anti- Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.
Indonesia considers that the measures at issue in this dispute should
be withdrawn.
The panel however declined to exercise its discretion under the second
sentence of Article 19.1 of the DSU in the manner requested by Indonesia.
According to the panel report, the dispute concerns the anti-dumping
measures imposed by the European Union on imports of biodiesel from
Indonesia.
The AD measures were adopted following the conclusion of an investigation
on imports of biodiesel from Argentina and Indonesia.
This investigation was previously the subject of the dispute EU -
Biodiesel concerning a complaint by Argentina, in respect of imports
of biodiesel from Argentina.
The investigation was initiated by the European Commission on 29 August
2012 following a complaint submitted by the European Biodiesel Board
(EBB).
The EU authorities imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on 29 May
2013 and definitive anti-dumping duties on 27 November 2013.
Provisional anti-dumping duties were applied ranging from zero to
9.6% and were subsequently definitively collected on 27 November 2013.
Definitive dumping margins were calculated ranging from 8.8% to 23.3%
and definitive anti-dumping duties were applied corresponding to the
calculated injury margins, which ranged from 8.8% to 20.5%.
The duties were applied in the form of specific duties expressed as
a fixed amount in euro/tonne.
On 20 December 2016, the European Commission initiated a review of
the anti-dumping measures imposed on imports of biodiesel originating
in Argentina to bring them into conformity with the recommendations
and rulings adopted by the DSB, following the adoption of the panel
report, as modified by the Appellate Body report in the EU - Biodiesel
(Argentina) dispute.
In its notice of initiation, the European Commission indicated that
it also considered it appropriate to examine the anti-dumping measures
imposed on imports of biodiesel from Indonesia, considering that:
(a) the anti-dumping measures imposed on imports of biodiesel from
Indonesia are subject to a WTO dispute and involve essentially the
same claims as raised by Argentina in the EU - Biodiesel (Argentina)
dispute; and (b) the legal interpretations contained in the adopted
panel and Appellate Body reports in EU - Biodiesel (Argentina) appear
also to be relevant for the investigation concerning Indonesia.
Indonesia requested that the Panel find that the anti-dumping measures
imposed by the European Union on imports of biodiesel from Indonesia
are inconsistent with:
a. Articles 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article
VI:1(b)(ii) of the GATT 1994 because in constructing the normal value
for the Indonesian producers under investigation, the European Union
did not calculate the cost of production of biodiesel on the basis
of the records kept by those producers even though the records were
in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles and
accurately and reasonably reflected the actual cost of production
of biodiesel, and because the European Union therefore failed to properly
calculate the cost of production and properly construct the normal
value for those producers.
b. Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the European
Union failed to construct the normal value for the Indonesian producers
under investigation on the basis of the cost of production of biodiesel
in the country of origin, i.e. Indonesia.
c. Articles 2.2 and 2.2.2(iii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because
when constructing the normal value for the Indonesian producers under
investigation, the European Union did not establish a cap for the
profits as required by Article 2.2.2(iii) and the amount for profits
established was not determined by the European Union on the basis
of a reasonable method. The European Union therefore failed to properly
construct the normal value for those producers.
d. Articles 2.3 and 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the
European Union did not construct the export price for one Indonesian
producer under investigation on the basis of the price at which the
imported biodiesel was first resold to independent buyers in the European
Union.
e. Article 9.3 (chapeau) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article
VI:2 of the GATT 1994 because on account of the inconsistencies with
Article 2 specified above in the context of the calculation of the
dumping margin for the Indonesian producers, the European Union calculated
a margin of dumping and imposed and collected anti-dumping duties
in excess of the actual dumping margin, if any, by the Indonesian
producers. This resulted in the levy of anti-dumping duties on the
Indonesian producers that exceeded their margin of dumping which,
under Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, operates as the ceiling
for the amount of anti-dumping duty that can be levied in respect
of the sales made by a producer/exporter.
f. Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the
European Union's determination of injury to the Union industry was
not based on an objective examination of the effect of those imports
on prices in the domestic market for biodiesel and the consequent
impact of those allegedly dumped imports on domestic producers of
biodiesel.
The European Union's findings regarding the price effects of the allegedly
dumped imports including price undercutting were not based on an objective
examination of the evidence on the record as, among others, the European
Union did not ensure price comparability in terms of physical characteristics
and model-matching and based its determination of price undercutting
on partial and unexplained sales of the sampled European Union producers.
g. Articles 7.1, 7.2, 9.2, and 9.3 (chapeau) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
because the European Union incorrectly imposed and definitively collected
provisional anti-dumping duties with respect to the imports from one
Indonesian producer under investigation, in excess of the actual provisional
margin of dumping of this producer, as it based itself on a provisional
dumping margin tainted by calculation errors.
Indonesia requested the Panel to make use of its discretion under
the second sentence of Article 19.1 of the DSU by suggesting ways
in which the European Union should implement the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB to bring its measures into conformity with the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and the GATT 1994.
According to the panel, Indonesia claims that the anti-dumping measures
applied by the European Union on biodiesel imports from Indonesia
are inconsistent with Articles 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article VI:1(b)(ii) of the GATT 1994, as follows:
a. First, the European Union acted inconsistently with the first sentence
of Article 2.2.1.1 and, as a consequence Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article VI:1(b)(ii) of the GATT 1994, by failing to
calculate the cost of production on the basis of the records kept
by the producers. Indonesia submits that the costs of crude palm oil
(CPO) reflected in the records of the exporting producers were substituted
with the reference export price for CPO published by the Indonesian
authorities.
b. Second, the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.2
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:1(b)(ii) of the GATT
1994 by failing to construct the normal value for the Indonesian producers
under investigation on the basis of the cost of production of biodiesel
in the country of origin, Indonesia.
Indonesia submits that the substance of its claims are indistinguishable
from claims raised by Argentina under these provisions in the dispute
EU - Biodiesel (Argentina) in respect of anti-dumping measures imposed
on imports of biodiesel from Argentina.
Indonesia submits that given the identical fact pattern and decisions
made by the European Union, these claims warrant the same finding
of inconsistency with the above provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and GATT 1994.
According to the panel report, the European Union has not disputed
the relevance of the findings contained in the panel and Appellate
Body reports in EU - Biodiesel (Argentina) to the resolution of the
dispute.
With respect to the EU authorities' determination of the cost of production
for the construction of normal value for Indonesian biodiesel producers,
the panel noted that on 29 May 2013, the European Commission imposed
provisional anti-dumping duties on biodiesel originating in Argentina
and Indonesia, imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on Indonesian
producers at margins of between zero and 9.6%.
The EU authorities concluded that since both the Argentine and Indonesian
domestic markets for biodiesel were heavily regulated, domestic sales
were not in the ordinary course of trade, and the normal value would
have to be constructed. To construct normal value, the EU authorities
calculated the normal value by adding to the producers' own production
costs during the investigation period, the selling, general, and administrative
(SG&A) expenses incurred and a reasonable profit margin.
At that time, the petitioner, the EBB, claimed that the "Differential
Export Tax" (DET) system in Argentina and Indonesia depresses
the price of soybeans and soybean oil (the main raw material inputs
used in the production of biodiesel in Argentina) and CPO (the main
raw material input used in the production of biodiesel in Indonesia)
and therefore distorts the costs of biodiesel producers.
The EU authorities indicated that they did not have enough information
at that stage to make a decision as to the most appropriate way to
address that claim. The EU authorities indicated that the question
as to whether the costs reasonably reflect the costs associated with
the production of biodiesel would be further examined at the definitive
stage.
In the Definitive Disclosure, the EU authorities confirmed that their
further investigation had established that the DET system in place
in Indonesia and Argentina depressed the domestic prices of the main
raw material input in Indonesia and Argentina to artificially low
levels, and as a consequence, this affected the cost of biodiesel
producers in both countries.
The EU authorities explained that, due to the distortions caused by
the DET system in the respective countries, the costs of the main
raw material were not reasonably reflected in the records kept by
the producers. In the case of Indonesia, the EU authorities noted
that during the investigation period, biodiesel exports were taxed
between 2% and 5%, while CPO exports were taxed between 15% and 20%.
The export for palm fruit was set at a rate of 40%.
The EU authorities concluded that since the DET system limits the
possibility to export CPO, larger quantities of CPO are available
on the domestic market, which lowers domestic CPO prices. The EU authorities
noted that the domestic price of CPO was significantly lower than
the international reference price, with the difference "being
very close to the export tax applied to CPO".
In light of its finding that the markets were distorted, the EU authorities
therefore decided to disregard the actual costs of raw materials as
recorded by the Argentine and Indonesian investigated companies in
their accounts and replace those costs with the price at which those
companies would have purchased the raw materials in the absence of
a distortion, in constructing the respective normal values of Argentine
and Indonesian producers.
To replace the costs in the records of Indonesian producers, the EU
authorities used the reference price (HPE) for CPO published by the
Indonesian authorities.
The EU authorities explained that the published HPE price is a reference
export price that is set monthly by Indonesian authorities and averages
the published international prices from three different sources: cost,
insurance, and freight (CIF) Rotterdam, CIF Malaysia, and the Indonesian
commodity exchange market. The HPE price is set on the basis of the
same sources, on a free on board (FOB) basis.
The Government of Indonesia and several Indonesian producers raised
objections concerning the decision by the EU authorities to replace
the recorded costs of CPO in the constructed normal value.
In the Definitive Regulation, the EU authorities confirmed their conclusion
that domestic prices of CPO were artificially lower than international
prices due to the distortion caused by the Indonesian DET. The EU
authorities additionally confirmed their decision to use reference
HPE prices published by the Indonesian authorities and rejected comments
made by Indonesian producers and the Government of Indonesia.
In its analysis, the panel recalled the findings of the panel, as
upheld by the Appellate Body in EU - Biodiesel (Argentina) regarding
the obligations contained in Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
and Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:1(b)(ii)
of the GATT 1994.
"We consider the panel's findings that the European Union acted
inconsistently with these provisions in that dispute are directly
relevant to the assessment of Indonesia's claims in this proceeding."
The panel therefore upheld Indonesia's claim that the European Union
acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
by failing to calculate the cost of production of the producers under
investigation on the basis of the records kept by the producers.
In addition, the panel upheld Indonesia's claim that the European
Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Article VI:1(b)(ii) of the GATT 1994 by using a cost for CPO that
was not the cost prevailing "in the country of origin" in
the construction of normal value.
The panel also noted that Indonesia claims that the method applied
by the European Union to establish an amount for profits for Indonesian
producers is inconsistent with Articles 2.2 and 2.2.2(iii) of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Indonesia alleges that the European Union's approach suffers from
two main flaws. First, Indonesia claims that the European Union acted
inconsistently with the requirement in Article 2.2.2(iii) to calculate
a cap for profits, i.e. "the profit normally realized by other
exporters or producers on sales of products of the same general category
in the domestic market of the country of origin".
Second, Indonesia claims that the European Union did not determine
an amount for profits on the basis of a "reasonable" method,
as required under Articles 2.2 and 2.2.2(iii).
Following its analysis, the panel concluded that Indonesia has demonstrated
that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.2(iii)
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the original investigation in determining
the amount for profits for Indonesian producers by failing to determine
the profit cap, i.e. "the profit normally realized by other exporters
or producers on sales of products of the same general category in
the domestic market of the country of origin".
As a result of this violation, Indonesia further requested that the
panel find the European Union also acted inconsistently with Article
2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
The panel noted that the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 indicates that amounts
for administrative, selling, and general costs and for profits shall
be determined "[f]or the purpose of paragraph 2" of Article
2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Accordingly, the panel considered that Indonesia's claim under Article
2.2 is purely consequential, and it therefore additionally found that
the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
The panel rejected Indonesia's request that it find that the European
Union additionally acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.2(iii) because
the European Union failed to determine the amount for profit based
on a "reasonable method" within the meaning of Article 2.2.2(iii)
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
The panel concluded that there is a mandatory requirement in Article
2.2.2(iii) to calculate a profit cap, i.e. "the profit normally
realized by other exporters or producers on sales of products of the
same general category in the domestic market of the country of origin".
As the EU authorities did not establish, or even attempt to establish
such a cap in the investigation of Indonesian producers, the panel
found that Indonesia has demonstrated that the European Union acted
inconsistently with Article 2.2.2(iii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
in failing to determine the profit cap and ensure that the profit
amount established by the EU authorities does not exceed such a cap.
"We concluded that the European Union also acted inconsistently
with Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a result of failing
to determine the profit cap. We reject, however, Indonesia's request
that we find that the European Union additionally acted inconsistently
with Article 2.2.2(iii) because the European Union failed to determine
the amount for profit based on a "reasonable method" within
the meaning of Article 2.2.2(iii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,"
said the panel.
The panel further examined Indonesia's claims that the European Union
acted inconsistently with Article 2.3 and the fourth and fifth sentences
of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to construct
the export price of one Indonesian exporting producer, P. T. Musim
Mas, on the basis of the price at which the imported biodiesel produced
by P. T. Musim Mas was first resold to independent buyers in the European
Union.
In its analysis, the panel considered that the price charged to the
first independent buyer is the starting-point for the construction
of an export price under Article 2.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
In constructing the export price, the panel considered that a Member
must begin by determining the sum in money for which the imported
product was bought by or sold to an independent buyer.
There is no further guidance to the term price in Article 2.3 relating
to the price of products first resold to an independent buyer. On
this basis, the panel considered that the premium that the customer
pays to P. T. Musim Mas' related importer is properly considered as
part of the price that is charged to first independent buyers.
Therefore, the panel found that Indonesia has established that the
European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement by failing to include the double counting premium as part
of the price at which imported biodiesel produced by P. T. Musim Mas
was first resold to an independent buyer within the meaning of that
provision.
On whether the European Union's consideration of price effects was
consistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
the panel noted that Indonesia claims that the EU authorities' consideration
of the price effects of dumped imports is inconsistent with Articles
3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Indonesia raises two main claims: (a) the EU authorities failed to
ensure price comparability between imported and domestic biodiesel,
by relying on low volume sales of cold filter plugging point (CFPP)
13 degrees centigrade biodiesel produced by the EU industry in calculating
an adjustment to the price of Indonesian imports; and
(b) the EU authorities failed to establish the existence of significant
price undercutting by failing: (i) to take into account noticeable
differences between imported and domestic biodiesel; and (ii) to examine
the significance of price undercutting with regard to the majority
of the EU industry's sales.
Following its analysis, the panel found that Indonesia failed to establish
that the European Union acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and
3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, by relying on prices of CFPP 13
biodiesel produced by the EU industry in calculating an adjustment
to the price of Indonesian imports.
It further found that Indonesia made a prima facie case that the EU
authorities acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, by failing to establish the existence of significant
price undercutting with regard to Indonesian imports.
"Since that prima facie case has not been rebutted, we uphold
Indonesia's claim accordingly."
On whether the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 9.3
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 by
imposing and levying anti-dumping duties in excess of the margins
of dumping, the panel considered that "margin of dumping"
referred to in Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement relates to
a margin of dumping that is established in a manner subject to the
disciplines of Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and which is
therefore consistent with those disciplines.
The panel found that Indonesia has made a prima facie case that the
European Union acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement by imposing anti-dumping duties in excess of the margin
of dumping that should have been established under Article 2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
In addition, the panel found that the same considerations that informed
its assessment of Indonesia's claim under Article 9.3 apply mutatis
mutandis to its assessment of its Article VI:2 claim. The panel therefore
also concluded that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article
VI:2 of the GATT 1994.
The panel noted that Indonesia submits that the European Union committed
several errors in calculating a provisional margin of dumping of 2.8%
for the sampled Indonesian producer, P. T. Musim Mas, which led to
an inflated provisional dumping margin that otherwise would have been
negative.
Indonesia claims that the European Union acted inconsistently with
a number of provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it applied
and definitively collected provisional anti-dumping duties on imports
from P. T. Musim Mas.
The panel said it has addressed claims raised by Indonesia under Articles
7.1(ii), 7.2, 9.2, and the chapeau of Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, in relation to the European Union's determination of a
provisional margin of dumping for P. T. Musim Mas that led to the
subsequent application of provisional duties to P. T. Musim Mas and
the definitive collection of those duties.
The panel found that Indonesia has failed to establish a basis for
its claims under Articles 7.2 and 7.1(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
as concerns the definitive collection of provisional anti-dumping
duties on imports from P. T. Musim Mas, in the view that Indonesia
does not challenge findings related to the imposition of provisional
measures contained in the Provisional Regulation.
In addition, the panel rejected Indonesia's claims that the European
Union acted inconsistently with Article 9.2 or the chapeau of 9.3
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The panel concluded as follows:
a. the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to calculate the cost of production
of the product under investigation on the basis of the records kept
by the producers; the panel did not reach findings as to whether,
as a consequence, the European Union acted inconsistently with Article
2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:1(b)(ii) of the GATT
1994;
b. the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:1(b) (ii) of the GATT 1994 by
using a "cost" for the main input that was not the cost
prevailing "in the country of origin", Indonesia;
c. the European Union acted inconsistently with Articles 2.2.2(iii)
and 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to determine "the
profit normally realized by other exporters or producers on sales
of products of the same general category in the domestic market of
the country of origin"; the panel rejected Indonesia's request
that it find that the European Union additionally acted inconsistently
with Article 2.2.2(iii) because the European Union failed to determine
the amount for profit based on a "reasonable method" within
the meaning of Article 2.2.2(iii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;
d. the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 2.3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to construct the export price of
one Indonesian exporting producer, P. T. Musim Mas, on the basis of
the price at which the imported biodiesel produced by P. T. Musim
Mas was first resold to independent buyers in the European Union;
e. Indonesia has not established that the European Union acted inconsistently
with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, by relying
on prices of CFPP 13 biodiesel produced by the EU industry in calculating
an adjustment to the price of Indonesian imports;
f. the European Union acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, by failing to establish the existence
of significant price undercutting with regard to Indonesian imports;
g. the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 by imposing
anti-dumping duties in excess of the margins of dumping that should
have been established under Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994, respectively;
h. Indonesia has not established that the European Union acted inconsistently
with Article 7.1(ii) of the Anti- Dumping Agreement because it applied
provisional measures to P. T. Musim Mas based on a WTO inconsistent
preliminary determination of the existence of dumping for P. T. Musim
Mas;
i. Indonesia has not established that the European Union acted inconsistently
with Article 7.2 of the Anti- Dumping Agreement because it applied
to P. T. Musim Mas a provisional anti-dumping duty in excess of the
provisionally estimated margin of dumping for P. T. Musim Mas;
j. Indonesia has not established that the European Union acted inconsistently
with Article 9.2 of the Anti- Dumping Agreement because the provisional
anti-dumping duty that was applied to P. T. Musim Mas and definitively
collected was not in an "appropriate amount", within the
meaning of Article 9.2; and
k. Indonesia has not established that the European Union acted inconsistently
with Article 9.3 of the Anti- Dumping Agreement by applying to P.
T. Musim Mas and definitively collecting a provisional anti-dumping
duty in excess of the provisionally estimated margin of dumping for
this exporting producer.