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Info Service on Sustainable Agriculture Geneva, 31 May (D. Ravi Kanth) – The developing countries seem to have suffered their biggest setback yet in the proposed agriculture deliverables tabled by the WTO Director-General, Ms Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, for the WTO’s 12th ministerial conference (MC12), as she appears to have finally put paid to a decision on the permanent solution for public stockholding (PSH) programs for food security, according to the restricted documents released on 30 May. In her proposed “Plan B” decisions that were shared with select countries prior to a closed-door meeting she held with some 14 countries, the outstanding mandated decision on the permanent solution for PSH programs is deferred to the 13th ministerial conference, scheduled to take place in 2024. The DG’s proposed solution on PSH, according to a document sent to members by email on the morning of 30 May, is as follows: “Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes (PSH) 1. Recalling the Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013 (WT/MIN(13)/38 – WT/L/913), the General Council Decision of 27 November 2014 (WT/L/939) and the Ministerial Decision of 21 December 2015 (WT/MIN(15)/44 – WT/L/979), and recognizing the importance of public stockholding for food security purposes for some developing country Members, including least developed countries, we undertake to continue our negotiations and make all concerted efforts to agree to a permanent solution to the PSH issue by MC13.” Surprisingly, the DG omitted any mention of what happened at the WTO’s eleventh ministerial conference (MC11) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in December 2017 when the US single handedly blocked the decision on the permanent solution for PSH programs. Ms Okonjo-Iweala’s draft decision mentions the importance of public stockholding for food security purposes for “some” developing country Members, including least developed countries, which appears to be grossly incorrect, as more than 90 countries, including the G-33 group of more than 40 countries, the African Group, and some countries in South America have demanded the permanent solution for PSH programs since the 10th ministerial conference (MC10) held in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 2015, said people, who asked not to be quoted. The other two paragraphs of the DG’s “Plan B” outcome on PSH state that: A. These comprehensive negotiations (on the permanent solution) shall consider all relevant elements pertaining to the operation of PSH programmes, including programme and product coverage, transparency, safeguards/anti-circumvention, legal certainty and other elements raised or which may be put forward by Members. [The DG has removed the reference to external reference prices of 1986-88 and its inflationary impact in the calculation of the AMS (aggregate measurement of support or the most trade-distorting subsidies) following opposition from the US, the European Union, and Cairns Group of farm-exporting countries who apparently do not want this issue to be addressed). B. The negotiations would continue to be held in dedicated sessions of the CoA-SS. Periodic progress reports on the negotiations to achieve a permanent solution will be provided by the CoA-SS Chair to the General Council in between the 12th and the 13th sessions of the Ministerial Conference. Given the postponements to finalizing the decision on the permanent solution for PSH programs since MC10, and then MC11, and now the latest DG’s draft text, a decision on the permanent solution appears like “a mirage in the WTO’s desert” for developing countries, said an analyst, who asked not to be quoted. With continued opposition to the permanent solution for PSH programs from the United States, the European Union, and a section of the Cairns Group of farm-exporting countries, it appears to be clear that the permanent solution for PSH programs may not be concluded at MC13 or even MC14 as and when they are held, the analyst suggested. The other two “Plan B” documents issued by the DG on 30 May include a “draft ministerial declaration on trade and food security,” and a “draft ministerial decision on World Food Programme food purchases exemptions from export prohibitions or restrictions,” for MC12 (see separate articles below). The three documents, seen by the SUNS, would constitute what appears to be “Plan B” outcomes that would “kick the can down the road” on (1) the mandated issue of permanent solution for public stockholding programs for food security; (2) the draft declaration on trade and food security that includes best endeavour provisions; and (3) a rather diluted decision on the World Food Programme that would allow least-developed countries to take measures to address their specific domestic conditions regardless of the decision to not adopt trade restrictions on WFP purchases, said several trade envoys, who preferred not to be quoted. The DG and the chair of the Doha agriculture negotiations, Ambassador Gloria Abraham Peralta of Costa Rica, have made some minimal changes to the three documents before sending them to members on 31 May, said people familiar with the development. Many developing countries appear to be very concerned that none of their core concerns such as the permanent solution for PSH programs, cotton, and even textual proposals on domestic support are being addressed at MC12. “The WTO does not work for addressing the concerns of the poorest and developing countries and we feel cheated,” said a coordinator of a major bloc of developing countries, who preferred not to be identified. What is also clear from the three draft decisions, the coordinator said, is how the DG appears to have aligned her decisions in tandem with the demands made by the United States and the European Union. At the informal mini-ministerial meeting held in Davos on 25 May, India and Indonesia among others pushed back against the DG’s decision to postpone an outcome on the PSH issue to the 13th ministerial conference, said people familiar with the development. These two countries sought to know whether the DG will adopt the same approach for fisheries subsidies, whose draft text appears to be heavily tilted in favour of the big subsidizers like China, the European Union, the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea, and other countries that have contributed to the problem of overcapacity and overfishing and thereby responsible for the global depletion of fish stocks. “The draft text of a fisheries subsidies agreement is apparently inconsistent with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14.6 and the Buenos Aires Declaration that called for prohibiting harmful subsidies provided by the big subsidizers, but the text goes contrary to that mandate,” said an African trade official, who asked not to be quoted. The SDG 14.6 states: “By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade Organization fisheries subsidies negotiation(s).” The three decisions with minimal changes in the draft texts following a meeting of select countries on 30 May will come up for discussion at the Doha agriculture negotiating body meeting on 1 June. DRAFT DECISION ON AGRICULTURE The full text of the draft decision on agriculture issued by the DG on 30 May is as follows: “Draft ministerial DECISION on agriculture The Ministerial Conference, Having regard to paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO); Recalling the long-term objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system and to provide for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets as stated in the Preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA); Recognizing the role that a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system could play in supporting progress towards the targets set out under the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, including to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, promote sustainable agriculture and food systems, and strengthen the policy response to climate change through both mitigation and adaptation actions; Taking note of the achievements in the negotiations to date, as well as the need to make further progress in order to fulfil existing mandates relevant to the agriculture negotiations, including as set out in Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) as well as the Bali and Nairobi Ministerial Decisions; Decides as follows: 1. We commit to continue our negotiations with a view to reducing support and protection progressively and substantially in achieving meaningful reform. We reaffirm that special and differential treatment is an integral part of all elements of the negotiations, having particular regard to the needs of developing country Members especially those of least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. Non-trade concerns, including food security and the protection of the environment shall also be taken into account in these negotiations. 2. We resolve to intensify our negotiations on the topics listed below, with a view to achieving modalities in relevant areas and other outcomes by the Thirteenth Session of the Ministerial Conference (MC13). These negotiations shall build on progress made thus far in the negotiations under the auspices of the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA-SS), including in dedicated sessions, and Members’ existing and future submissions, including technical discussions informed by relevant data. Domestic Support 3. We undertake to continue negotiations on domestic support after MC12 with a view to reducing substantially trade-distorting domestic support and to improving relevant disciplines, within a reasonable timeframe to be agreed by Members, in accordance with the reform programme provided for in Article 20 of the AoA and the modalities that will be agreed and adopted by MC13. 4. Unless otherwise provided, all Members will be expected to contribute in these negotiations according to the modalities to be agreed by Members. In this respect, the needs of low-income or resource-poor farmers in developing country Members shall particularly be taken into account. 5. We note the importance of the implementation of existing notification obligations under Article 18 of the AoA and undertake to make the necessary efforts to provide outstanding domestic support notifications prioritizing as from the year 2010 to enhance transparency with respect to existing domestic support commitments, while taking into account the different capacities of developing country Members, especially the least-developed among them. We agree to explore options for facilitating the submission of the required information in DS:1 notifications by Members in a timely manner, and consider including necessary elements such as value of production data. 6. We instruct the WTO Secretariat to maintain and update on a regular basis a domestic support analytical tool based on Members’ notifications as well as publicly available official information in consultation with relevant Members. Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes (PSH) 7. Recalling the Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013 (WT/MIN(13)/38 – WT/L/913), the General Council Decision of 27 November 2014 (WT/L/939) and the Ministerial Decision of 21 December 2015 (WT/MIN(15)/44 – WT/L/979), and recognizing the importance of public stockholding for food security purposes for some developing country Members, including least developed countries, we undertake to continue our negotiations and make all concerted efforts to agree to a permanent solution to the PSH issue by MC13. 8. These comprehensive negotiations shall consider all relevant elements pertaining to the operation of PSH programmes, including programme and product coverage, transparency, safeguards/anti-circumvention, legal certainty and other elements raised or which may be put forward by Members. 9. The negotiations would continue to be held in dedicated sessions of the CoA-SS. Periodic progress reports on the negotiations to achieve a permanent solution will be provided by the CoA-SS Chair to the General Council in between the 12th and the 13th sessions of the Ministerial Conference. Market Access 10. We undertake to continue negotiations on market access after MC12 with a view to improving substantially and progressively agricultural market access opportunities for all Members within a timeframe to be agreed by Members, in accordance with the reform programme provided for in Article 20 of the AoA. 11. These negotiations may be informed by technical discussions and shall consider all relevant elements under the market access pillar with a view to making tangible progress by MC13. 12. We agree to the continuation of discussions on enhancing transparency, including in the application of changes to MFN applied ordinary tariff rates to provide greater certainty and predictability to businesses and traders, especially those who have shipments en route during such changes in applied tariffs in the destination markets. Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) 13. We undertake to continue negotiations on a special safeguard mechanism (SSM) for developing country Members in dedicated sessions of the CoA-SS pursuant to the Nairobi Ministerial Decision (WT/MIN(15)/43 – WT/L/978). 14. We instruct Members to engage in enhanced technical discussions, inter alia, on product scope, triggers, remedies, cross-check, treatment of preferential trade, and transparency for designing an SSM for developing countries as envisaged under paragraph 7 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. Technical elements of the existing Special Agricultural Safeguard instrument in Article 5 of the AoA and the experience gained in its implementation since 1995 may also be taken into account. 15. The General Council shall regularly review progress in these negotiations with the aim of making recommendations for the consideration of Ministers at MC13. Export Restrictions 16. We undertake to continue negotiations after MC12 with the aim of enhancing transparency and predictability of export prohibitions and restrictions, including through improvements of relevant disciplines. To this end we are committed to work towards reviewing and clarifying Article 12 of the AoA by MC13, bearing in mind Article 12.2, including the provisions pertaining to: (i) the requirement that Members give due consideration to the effects of their measures on importing Members’ food security; (ii) Members’ practices regarding advance written notices; and (iii) transparency requirements for measures of a longer duration. Export Competition 17. We reaffirm our commitment to ensure an effective implementation and monitoring of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition (WT/MIN(15)/45- WT/L/980) and undertake to continue negotiations after MC12 particularly building on the evidence amassed during the review undertaken in the Committee on Agriculture (CoA), in order to enhance disciplines on export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes, agricultural exporting state trading enterprises and international food aid. These disciplines shall aim at ensuring that there is no circumvention of the relevant disciplines which undermine export subsidy elimination commitments and to prevent non-commercial transactions from being used to circumvent such commitments. Special consideration shall be given to the needs and circumstances of least- developed and net food importing developing countries. Cotton 18. We undertake to continue negotiations after MC12 with a view to reducing trade-distorting domestic support for cotton in accordance with modalities to be agreed by MC13 and in line with the mandate to address it ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically within the agriculture negotiations taking into account progress made in the overall domestic support negotiations. 19. We reaffirm the importance of transparency and undertake to continue holding Dedicated Discussions on cotton on a bi-annual basis, as mandated by paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Bali Ministerial Decision on Cotton (WT/MIN(13)/41 – WT/L/916) and confirmed in paragraph 14 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Cotton (WT/MIN(15)/46 – WT/L/981). 20. We note that the development-related aspects of cotton are addressed under the Director-General’s Consultative Framework Mechanism on Cotton and welcome the work undertaken in this context, which will continue to be handled as provided for in paragraph 12 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(05)/DEC) and in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Cotton. Transparency 21. We invite the WTO Secretariat to pursue efforts to assist developing country Members, upon their request, to comply with the relevant notification and other relevant transparency and monitoring requirements, including through ad hoc advice, technical assistance and capacity-building support. We direct the Secretariat to provide information on a regular basis to the CoA on these activities. 22. We agree to work in the CoA to review, update and streamline as necessary through an evidence-based process the transparency provisions contained in document G/AG/2 as well as other agriculture related transparency requirements. Due consideration shall be given to the capacity constraints faced by some developing countries, especially the least developed among them.” In short, the DG appears to have given a short shrift to the specific demands and concerns raised by the developing countries for whom agriculture reform, involving hundreds of billions of dollars of trade-distorting domestic subsidies provided by the European Union, the United States, Japan, Norway, and Korea among others, is at the core of their agenda. Under the pretext of the Uruguay Round’s commitments, the big subsidizers are able to protect their farm subsidies, while denying the same entitlement to developing countries, said several people, who asked not to be quoted.
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