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Info Service on Climate Change (Nov25/01) Lima, 5 Nov (Prerna Bomzan): The 63rd session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC-63) which met on 27-30 October in Lima, Peru, continued to witness divergences over the workplan of the 7th Assessment Report (AR7), as regards the respective timelines for the production of the three Working Group (WG) reports as contributions to the AR7. The main bone of contention over the workplan is whether the three WG reports should be completed in 2028 mainly to feed into the Paris Agreement’s second global stocktake (GST2), or at a reasonably later time without “compromising” and “politicising” climate science by compressing timelines to align with GST2. Negotiations on the issue eventually did not land in consensus and a decision on the workplan timelines has again been deferred to “future sessions”. (See details below). [The GST is a process under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement (PA), to periodically assess the collective progress towards achieving its long-term goals, and is to be held every five years. The first GST concluded in 2023 at the UNFCCC’s 28th Conference of Parties (COP28) in Dubai, UAE, while GST2 is scheduled for COP 33 in 2028.] [The IPCC is the UN body for assessing the science related to climate change. It traditionally produces three Working Group (WG) reports: WGI report on ‘The Physical Science Basis’; WGII report on ‘Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’; and WGIII report on ‘Mitigation of Climate Change’. A Synthesis Report (SYR) is usually produced integrating information from the three WG reports and also based on any Special Report/s – assessment on specific issue – produced during the assessment cycle. Methodology Reports are also produced by the IPCC which provide practical guidelines for the preparation of national greenhouse gas inventories. For the current AR7 cycle, besides the three WG reports and SYR, the following suite of products has also been agreed: a Special Report on Climate Change and Cities (SR-Cities), a Methodology Report on Short-Lived Climate Forcers (MR SLCF) and a Methodology Report on Carbon Dioxide Removal Technologies, Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage (MR CDR/CCUS), all to be delivered by 2027. Further, an updated IPCC Technical Guidelines on Impacts and Adaptation has been agreed as well as a separate product to be developed in conjunction with the WGII report.] Right from the outset since IPCC-60 held in January 2024 in Istanbul, Turkey, the irreconcilable debate of “politics versus science” has dominated over the timelines of the three WG reports. Despite objections for the rushed timeline of 2028, at IPCC-61, the strategic planning schedule proposed delivery dates of the reports as follows: WGI report in May 2028, WGII report in June 2028 and WGIII report in July-August 2028. Further, at IPCC-62, the proposed implementation plans of WGI, WGII and WGIII continued in showing the same timeline of the delivery of the reports. (See IPCC-60 TWN Update, IPCC-61 TWN Update, IPCC-62 TWN Update). At IPCC-63, the workplan of the three WG reports was presented with placeholders for the schedule. However, developed countries, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and several Least Developed Countries (LDCs) advocated their entrenched position of “policy relevance” for the WG reports to be ready on time in 2028 to inherently input into the GST2 and to refrain from what they claimed as “micromanagement” of a procedural matter. They generally favoured the proposed implementation plans of the three WG reports presented at IPCC-62. On the other hand, India, Saudi Arabia, China, Kenya, and South Africa argued to the contrary, restating their concerns of a compressed timeline on “inclusivity”, “balance” and “robustness” of the reports “compromising” scientific integrity itself, due to severe challenges of national coordination among ministries, focal points and experts; the back-to-back government reviews of the different WG drafts; overlaps with the UNFCCC sessions when governments are engaged; limited knowledge production in terms of literature from the Global South and overburden on their authors; among other constraints, which was supported by Algeria, Venezuela, Jordan, Libya, Ghana, Burundi, Morocco, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Russia and Turkmenistan. On the second day of the session, a contact group was established by IPCC Chair Jim Skea (United Kingdom), which was co-facilitated by Brazil and Denmark. South Africa made clear that if the existing option is “take it or leave it” and unless there is openness to discuss different proposals or other options then the discussion would be very challenging, which was also echoed by Kenya. India then proposed for 8-weeks review starting with the first order draft; no review to be scheduled in June, October, November, December which coincides with the UNFCCC meetings; a clear one-month separation between every review and the next lead author meeting (LAM); specific gap between the fourth (last) LAM and the final government distribution (FGD) draft; and no back-to-back approvals of the WG reports. It pointed out that this is not micromanagement and that restricting to GST2 is equally micromanaging so there is a need to agree on reasonable considerations. India’s proposal was supported by Saudi Arabia, Kenya, South Africa and China who further elaborated on the principles that should apply to the timelines: namely no review of different WGs at the same time; no IPCC plenary during UNFCCC negotiations; one month between review and LAM for authors to prepare; extend the time for preparation and review of FGD draft (at least for WGII/WGIII) of at least 3 months; at least two months after FGD for government to prepare for plenary; and no government reviews during approval sessions. The next day, the conference room paper [CRP02] which presented the three WG timelines in a tabular format, displayed only minimal changes at the end of the cycle focusing on governments’ review and with the timeline still ending in 2028, leaving majority of the concerns still not accommodated which was pointed out by the proponents India, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, South Africa, China and supported by Ghana, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Venezuela, Burundi, Jordan, Zimbabwe, Turkmenistan, and Russia who stated that those who want all WG reports can instead postpone GST2. Kenya next called for a month-by-month “visual” format of the timelines as an aid for clarity which was supported by South Africa, India, Saudi Arabia, and China, who made clear that another version of the CRP is needed accommodating concerns, as the existing one is not a starting point for discussion. However, at the report back at the plenary after a couple of hours, the agreement to a month-by-month visual format of the timelines at the contact group was surprisingly not mentioned by the Co-Facilitators and when questioned, WGIII Co-Chair Katherine Calvin (United States) stated that they do not have the visual format yet. When the visual format was eventually produced, it made clear the concerns that were repeatedly voiced by the proponents, but faced reactions by Antigua and Barbuda, Norway, the United Kingdom, Italy, Nepal, Germany, Grenada, Samoa, Switzerland, Turkiye, Haiti, Sweden and Australia as being more “confusing” and of “micromanagement of the process.” IPCC Chair Skea also added that he was struggling to understand the overlaps argument when experts (and not governments) provide review to the first order draft and on overlap with the UNFCCC, the IPCC principle 15 states that scheduling of sessions of the Panel and WGs will be co-ordinated with other related international meetings. He further said that the decision on the SYR timeline was “by” late 2029 and not “in” 2029. On the last day of the session, with consensus on the timelines still elusive, Skea clearly stated that it is no use spending time pursuing solutions which are not viable and invited the IPCC’s Vice Chair, Ladislaus Chang’a (Tanzania), to conduct a “huddle” to explore any landing zone to achieve consensus. He further said that if the huddle comes back saying no basis for consensus, then procedural conclusions is the way out, similar to IPCC-62, taking a “year-by-year” incremental approach. The huddle agreed to a “range-based” framework for a landing zone to be explored in a contact group. However, this range-based format displayed in “quarters” of the calendar years failed to significantly address the repeated concerns of China, India, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, South Africa and Russia. With no consensus in sight, Chair Skea suggested the same course of action as followed at IPCC-62 and the decision was approved to continue work as indicated by the 2026 budget, by convening the second LAM meetings of the three WGs as well as the third LAM of WG1 in 2026, and to “defer” further consideration of the three WG report timelines to “future sessions”. China expressed “regret” over the failure to achieve agreement on the timelines and reiterated its concerns of ensuring “balance and inclusivity” given its lived experience of government coordination challenges with a shortened timeline. India underscored that as scientists it had made a “thorough examination and serious analysis” of issues of concerns but there was no opportunity to present from the very start, and when finally the opportunity was given it was too late. It called upon members to provide “submissions” before the next session stating that submissions are fundamental part of multilateral processes. “We are mindful of challenges the world faces, coming from a developing country”, it said, referring to a cyclone that hit back home, “with global warming largely caused by those who have resources to deal with”. India underlined the need for robustness and accuracy of work in the IPCC with highest quality and integrity. Saudi Arabia lamented that its concerns continue to fall on deaf ears despite repeating the same points in every discussion, yet not reflected or meaningfully addressed. It said that an open and transparent review by experts and governments around the world is an essential part of the IPCC process. Inclusivity is integral to the IPCC’s work; yet shortened timelines disproportionately affect developing countries. “Many of us do not have the same institutional or resource capacities to mobilise experts quickly, condglobuct national reviews, or provide comments within accelerated timeframes. As a result, our perspectives risk being underrepresented, and the reports risk failing to reflect the realities, vulnerabilities, and knowledge of the Global South”, it said, and added that “a shortened cycle also risks leaving out valuable scientific literature, particularly from developing countries where publication cycles and access to journals are more constrained. Failing to account for these differences would be a disservice not only to developing countries, but also to policymakers and the global public who rely on the IPCC for balanced and representative assessments”. Kenya stated that it hoped of agreeing on a timeline that ensures the AR7 reports are robust, balanced, comprehensive, and developed through an inclusive process. “As governments, it is our responsibility to ensure clarity on the details—this is not a sign of lesser commitment or micromanagement, but rather one of deeper commitment and respect for the scientific rigour that defines the IPCC, a process we seek to keep improving”. It said further that the need to force IPCC outputs into the GST process, at all cost, has become a great impediment to the work of the IPCC which is quite unfortunate. Forcing AR7 products to feed into GST will compromise their robustness, balance, comprehensiveness, and inclusivity and this would also send a troubling signal to authors that they must tailor their work to a “political process rather than scientific rigor”. It also added that this also sends a message to the global community that questions the credibility of the IPCC. “Science must guide policy, not the other way around”, it stressed, and added, “we have heard arguments around vulnerability and impacts of extreme weather and climate events. As vulnerable developing countries ourselves, facing similar impacts and with less responsibility for the climate crisis, we expect ambitious climate action from developed countries. That ambition must also be reflected in cooperation to deliver an assessment that upholds the IPCC’s credibility—one that is robust, balanced, comprehensive, and inclusive”. It supported the suggestion by India to invite members to submit inputs to support the process of arriving at converging timelines. South Africa expressed regret of not reaching agreement on the timeline, further pointing out that “even after raising numerous concerns with the proposed timeline and providing numerous concrete proposals to ensure inclusivity, robustness, comprehensiveness, quality and geographical representivity of the science, we feel that we weren’t sufficiently heard”. It requested that “our voices be heard as this will enhance inclusivity, balance and representivity of the science”. Further, in closing, South Africa, revealed that “certain delegations still resort to intimidation tactics to coerce some developing country delegations into changing their views and positions on important and critical issues within the IPCC process. This happened in the last session, and it continues to persist. Our humble request is that this type of conduct and behaviour is refrained from, as it is not in line with the principles, spirit and rapport of the UN and that it prevents inclusive, fair and just participation in IPCC processes”. It requested that the matter be “seriously addressed” by the IPCC. Ghana, Algeria, Russia also expressed disappointment that consensus could not be reached with Russia further calling for flexibility and compromise which it saw as lacking in the discussions. Germany, France, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Antigua and Barbuda, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Vanuatu, Nepal, New Zealand, Hungary, Grenada, Canada, Iceland, Monaco, Turkiye, Australia, Belize, and the European Union, all voiced their disappointment as well on not reaching agreement on the AR7 timeline, while Ireland stated optimism that the Panel can resolve it in the future session.
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