TWN Info Service on Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge (Aug26/09)
25 August 2026
Third World Network

CBD: Developing countries resist efforts to redefine Parties responsible to provide financial resources 

London, 24 Aug (Lim Li Ching) – Eighty-three developing county Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) have sent a clear message that they would reject any effort to undermine the Convention’s provisions that set out which Parties are responsible for the provision of financial resources.

The CBD Parties were in Nairobi for the Seventh meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI7), which was held from 3 to 12 August 2026. A key issue on the agenda was that of resource mobilization.

There were three main elements to the resource mobilization discussions, two of which stemmed from the road map set out in decision 16/34, which embody the delicate balance achieved at the second resumed session of the Sixteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) in February 2025. (See Resumed COP16 resolves deadlock, takes long overdue decision on financial mechanism, 14 March 2025.)

At that meeting, a dual-track approach was agreed that would be addressed in parallel – the establishment of the permanent arrangement for the financial mechanism of the Convention, and improving the mobilization of finance from all sources – issues important to developing countries and developed countries, respectively. They also agreed on an initial roadmap that lays out the tasks that need to be accomplished by the COP at each of its successive meetings to 2030.

SBI7 was to consider (i) further development of the criteria for the institutional structure operating the financial mechanism; (ii) identification of impediments to the effectiveness of global biodiversity finance and, on that basis, recommendation of elements for its further enhancement; and (iii) opportunities for broadening the contributor base. The first two tasks are part of the road map set out in decision 16/34.

[The final task for SBI7, the review of implementation of the strategy for resource mobilization, was undertaken through the global review of collective progress in the implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF). The review of implementation of the strategy therefore fed into the relevant sections of the global report that inputs to the global review.]

From the outset of the discussions at SBI7, it was clear that divergences continue to persist among Parties, especially along North-South lines. A Contact Group was set up, co-chaired by Lucretia Landmann (Switzerland) and Francis Meri Sabino Ogwal (Uganda). Its mandate was to address the three tasks above.

While many expected the negotiations over the criteria for the institutional structure to be the most difficult, it was the issue of “broadening the contributor base” to provide biodiversity finance, specifically in relation to sovereign contributors, that overshadowed everything else.

This issue was linked to proposals for the best periodicity for the issuance of the new round of notifications inviting developing country Parties and Parties with economies in transition to consider whether they are in a position to voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties in accordance with Article 20 of the Convention. Decision 16/34 requested the Executive Secretary to consider the best periodicity for such notifications, for consideration by the SBI.

Article 20(2) obligates developed country Parties to provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the costs of the implementation of their obligations under the Convention. Additionally, it provides for other Parties to voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties in this regard. It also stipulates that the COP will establish, periodically review and amend, as necessary, a list of developed country Parties and other Parties which voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties.

Developed country proposal unites developing countries

Sharp divergences emerged over a joint proposal made by Canada on behalf of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. (They were later joined by Iceland.)

The developed countries proposed that Parties classified as “high-income” under the World Bank country income classification should be used to review and amend the list of developed country Parties and other Parties that voluntarily assume the obligations of developed country Parties, with the exclusion of small island developing states (SIDS).

Eighty-three developing countries firmly rejected this proposal. The countries were the 54 members of the African Group, as well as Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Maldives, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Panama, the Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Venezuela. Their joint statement was shared with the Third World Network

At the session of the Contact Group dedicated to this issue on 9 August, the joint statement was made on their behalf.

The developing countries pointed to the absurdity of using an income metric as a proxy for development, which is multidimensional in nature. They pointed out that the World Bank’s income classification was designed primarily for its own administrative purposes and is based solely on gross national income (GNI) per capita.

The GNI per capita metric does not capture broader dimensions, “including persistent inequality, debt burdens, poverty, human capital, infrastructure, environmental sustainability among other the structural vulnerabilities, that many developing countries continue to face even after crossing the high-income threshold.”

Moreover, the developing countries insisted that any discussion on the issue must remain firmly grounded in the legal framework of the Convention. “Article 20(2) is clear and unambiguous: Parties not listed as developed countries in Decision I/2, as subsequently updated by Decision VIII/18 may voluntarily and based on explicit national consent, assume the obligations of developed country Parties.”

The developing countries highlighted that a systemic interpretation of the Convention requires that the same principle apply not only to the category of “other Parties voluntarily assuming the obligations of developed country Parties”, but also to any amendment of the developed country list itself.

Given that the voluntary nature of the provision is fundamental, they countered: “Any attempt to create an automatic trigger based on external criteria—regardless of the criterion selected—is therefore inconsistent with the Convention.”

Finally, the developing countries warned that such an approach would trigger unacceptable far-reaching repercussions, both within the CBD and beyond. This is because the Convention provides for differentiated treatment of developing countries in numerous provisions extending beyond financial resources. They strongly cautioned that the approach “would establish a precedent whereby legal obligations under the Convention are effectively redefined through an external classification created for a different purpose”.

As such, the developing countries rejected the proposed automatic process for amending the list under Article 20(2), particularly one based on the World Bank income classification.

The developed countries that forwarded the proposal claimed that it was not intended to dilute or diminish their obligations. They tried to clarify that their reading of Article 20(2) established a legally-binding obligation to review, and if necessary, amend the list.

This, they said, is “currently necessary and overdue as it has been 20 years, economic realities have shifted, and we need to increase the sources of biodiversity finance”.

[In fact, empirical evidence shows that the conventional narrative that poorer countries are “catching up” with richer countries is wrong. A recent paper published in the journal New Political Economy highlights that the opposite is occurring: the absolute income gap between advanced economies and the emerging and developing economies has actually increased since 1960, by 170–270% depending on the currency comparison used.

Third World Network, in an article for ECO, the daily civil society publication, further pointed out that as developed countries bear historical and continuing responsibility for global ecological breakdown, there is actually an ecological debt owed to developing countries and the Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women and youth who steward biodiversity, which should be repaid by the developed countries.]

The developed countries further stated that it would be COP that reviews the list and that a Party should not be included without consent, and that is where the criteria would make the process workable. They assured that the proposal would be specific to the CBD and Article 20 implementation, and that they were not seeking a broader determination of what constitutes a developed or developing country.

All options on the table

Following the exchange of views, where developing and developed countries both spoke in support of the two sides of the debate, the co-chairs set up a friends of the co-chairs group. Its mandate was to look at the three options set out in the non-paper, and to try to provide a basis for further negotiations at COP17 in October.

Option A was proposed by the Secretariat as laid out in the pre-session document, wherein starting at COP17, developed country Parties and Parties that may voluntarily assume those obligations would be invited to indicate their interest to be included in the corresponding list. After which, starting at COP19, invitations would be made at every other meeting (i.e. every four years). The list would be amended and adopted at every other meeting, starting from COP18.

Option B was the proposal from the developed countries, requesting the Executive Secretary to “review and amend the list of developed country Parties and other Parties that voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties using the World Bank country income classification as a proxy, to include Parties classified as “high income”, excluding Parties recognized by the United Nations as Small Island Developing States.” The amended list would be submitted for review and adoption at every meeting of the COP, starting at COP18.

Option C reflected the proposal from the European Union, that the Executive Secretary prepare an updated list, after consultations with Parties, for adoption at every meeting of the COP, starting at COP18.

The whole process, regardless of which option is chosen, would be reviewed at COP21.

The friends of the co-chairs group comprised Armenia, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Costa Rica, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the European Union, Japan, Kenya, Peru, Qatar, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Tunisia and the United Kingdom. It was open to other Parties joining and was co-facilitated by Canada and Tunisia. It met on 10 Aug for an hour.

The conversation began by going through a table, prepared by the co-facilitators and the Secretariat, of areas where there were convergence and divergence. While there was some agreement on basic parameters such as willingness to continue discussions, that more time is needed for such discussions, and that Article 20 must be the basis, numerous divergences remained.

Developing countries highlighted the need for clarity with regard to two separate processes – broadening the contributor base from all sources, and reviewing the list of developed country Parties and those that voluntarily assume the obligations of developed country Parties.

The former is mandated by decision 16/34 for discussion by the SBI, whereas the latter is not. Decision 16/34 only asks that the SBI consider the best periodicity for the issuance of the new round of notifications inviting other Parties to consider whether they are in a position to voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties.

There was disagreement about whether there is a need for a process to review the list, given that Article 20(2) already sets this out, and if there is such a need, how to go about doing so. Questions were also raised as to the legal interpretations of Article 20(2).

Nonetheless, inputs were provided by Parties, and the co-facilitators resolved to clean up the table and prepare elements for a proposed way forward.

The proposal from the friends of the co-chairs was then presented to the Contact Group, which met later the same day, to replace options A, B and C. It contained elements for both an SBI7 recommendation and the draft decision for COP17.

The proposed SBI7 recommendation asked COP17, in continuing the discussion on broadening the contributor base, to take into account the areas of convergence and divergence, and would have annexed the table from the friends of the co-chairs’ discussions.

The draft decision proposed that an analysis be undertaken of past practice in reviewing and amending the list, implications of inclusion in that list, including on provisions other than financial provisions, and the relationship between that list and the arrangements for contributions to the financial mechanism.

It also asked that consultations be carried out with Parties and other organizations on broadening the contributor base, and for a report to be prepared.

The SBI would then be asked to consider the report and analysis, develop options for broadening the contributor base, including options for a process to review the list, and prepare elements of a draft decision for consideration by COP18.

However, there was disagreement about whether the friends of the co-chairs’ proposal could replace options A, B and C, and whether the SBI recommendation should annex the table on convergences and divergences, the elements of which were also not agreed.

The co-chairs of the Contact Group eventually ruled that all four options would be bracketed and set out in the draft decision, with the friends of the co-chairs’ proposal becoming option D. The proposed SBI recommendation would not annex the table but merely refer to it.

When the conference room paper (CRP) came up for discussion during the plenary session of 11 August, the SBI Chair, Clarissa Souza Della Nina (Brazil), proposed that the CRP be adopted as a whole, with the contentious issues being left for COP17 to discuss.

However, Saudi Arabia, supported by Qatar, stated that the issue was highly sensitive and proposed to go through the CRP paragraph by paragraph. Qatar added that more than 80 developing countries had asked for the deletion of option B, and asked again that it be deleted, so that a more streamlined document could go forward to COP17.

China further noted that the issue is very sensitive, and that there was no time to go through the document paragraph by paragraph, while large divergences remain, and requested these facts be incorporated in the report of the meeting.

Qatar then asked for the whole document to be put in square brackets. Saudi Arabia added that each paragraph should also be individually placed in square brackets.

Following appeals by the Chair and other Parties not to place agreed text in brackets, Qatar then asked for its concerns to be reflected in the report in the meeting, recording that over 80 countries requested the deletion of option B, and that its understanding was that option D was the compromise option to replace options A, B and C.

The Chair then approved the CRP as whole, with the understanding that the draft decision would be wholly in brackets.

When the L-document (final draft with limited distribution) was discussed on the last day of the meeting (12 August), some confusion persisted as to where the brackets would start. Saudi Arabia expressed disappointment that the whole text was not in brackets as it had requested the day before.

The issue of contention was the paragraph in the SBI recommendation requesting the Secretariat to make available, to COP17, the non-exhaustive list of areas of convergence and divergence. Saudi Arabia insisted that there was also no consensus on the list, and therefore the text should be in brackets.

The Secretariat explained that the SBI recommendation could not contain brackets, otherwise there would be no recommendation from SBI7 to COP17. It further proposed that the brackets should start from the paragraph referring to the draft decision.

The Chair then asked a small group of interested parties, including Brazil, China, Costa Rica, the European Union, Fiji, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to convene at the back of the room to resolve this issue.

Fiji facilitated the huddle, and reported back on the compromise reached: that the paragraph of the SBI recommendation would have a phrase inserted noting that there was no opportunity to reach consensus on the non-exhaustive list, and that the brackets would then start from the draft decision text itself.

With that, the L-document was adopted.

Other key issues inch forward

The other key issues on the resource mobilization agenda did not progress much, despite their importance.

On the further development of the criteria for the institutional structure operating the financial mechanism, there was little progress made, despite developing countries’ best efforts.

After considerable discussion, Parties eventually agreed not to amend the minimum criteria already agreed in paragraph 21 of decision 16/34, that is:

“(a) It functions for the purpose of implementing the Convention and its Protocols,

(b) It is under the authority and guidance of, and accountable to, the Conference of the Parties.;

(c) It operates within a democratic and transparent system of governance, ensuring a structure that is fair, equitable, inclusive, efficient and representative;

(d) It is accessible by all eligible country Parties of the Convention in a fair, timely, simplified, equitable, inclusive, and non-discriminatory manner”.

Decision 16/34 had also requested that COP17 further develop the criteria, “taking into consideration the compilation of views contained in annex II”, which developing countries had fought to retain, and contained specific criteria for a possible dedicated instrument on biodiversity finance.

At SBI7, developing countries attempted to further amend and streamline the criteria, but there was little time for detailed discussion and continued divergences persisted.

Parties eventually agreed to delete redundancies and repetition. However, the remaining criteria and proposed amendments are all individually in brackets and will be on the table for discussion at COP17.

On the identification of impediments to the effectiveness of global biodiversity finance and recommendation of elements for its further enhancement, because of the lack of time to discuss an annex that specified these, Parties decided to delete that annex. The draft decision however takes note of the pre-session documentdetailing this analysis.

It also requests a future SBI to develop measures that could be taken to enhance global biodiversity finance, including the elements provided in the analysis, taking into account submissions made at SBI7. Still at issue is whether the submissions to be considered should be only from Parties, or also from observers.

Among the key structural issues identified by Parties and observers are the implications of sovereign debt burdens – both in terms of fiscal constraints and debt servicing incentivizing harmful activities. The need to address tax issues that could impact the availability of biodiversity finance was also highlighted, as were the links to ongoing negotiations of the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.

To add to these issues, the SBI6 recommendation on three studies – on the relationship between debt sustainability and implementation of the Convention, the implementation of safeguards in biodiversity financing mechanisms, and on the relationship between biodiversity and climate finance – will also have to be considered at COP17.

The paragraphs in the draft decision dealing with the three studies have been kept “in abeyance”, pending finalization of the studies and submission to COP17 for its consideration. As such, any suggested amendments to the draft decision resulting from insights contained in the final versions of the studies will also be considered. (See Resource mobilization talks avoid elephant in room, extend review of key studies, 13 March 2026.)

The resource mobilization agenda therefore promises to remain among the most complex and contentious discussions at COP17. +