|
THIRD WORLD NETWORK BIOSAFETY
INFORMATION SERVICE
21 May 2005
Dear Friends and colleagues,
RE: No World Health Assembly Endorsement of Genetically Engineered
Smallpox virus
In 2 days of discussion on Tuesday and Friday, a number of developing
and developed countries objected to proposals for expanded research on
smallpox virus, including the genetic engineering of this lethal virus.
Thus there was no endorsement for this plan by the 58th World Health Assembly
(WHA) meeting at the World Health Organisation headquarters in Geneva
from 16 to 25 May.
Below is a report of the statements made by a number of countries on Friday,
with many calling for the destruction of remaining stocks of the virus,
as agreed in an earlier WHA resolution. The US, Russia and Australia are
the proponents for more research while China supported by Canada, Cuba
and Saudi Arabia asked for a date to destroy the remaining smallpox virus
stocks. South Africa supported by Zimbabwe called for a new, more representative
and transparent "task team" to reassess existing smallpox virus
research.
For more information on this issue please see BIS (4 April) "Campaign
to stop smallpox genetic engineering" and BIS (9 May) "WHO DG
questions smallpox recommendation" and BIS (19 May) "World Health
Assembly debates smallpox virus research".
With best wishes,
Chee Yoke Heong
Third World Network
121-S Jalan Utama
10450 Penang
Malaysia
Email: twnet@po.jaring.my
Website: www.twnside.org.sg
REF: Doc.TWN/Biosafety/2005/J
No WHA Endorsement of Genetically Engineered Smallpox virus
Countries Urge Review of Recommendations and Variola Advisory
Committee
By Edward Hammond (The Sunshine Project) and Lim Li Ching (Third World
Network)
(Geneva, 20 May) - On Friday
afternoon, the 58th World Health Assembly (WHA) resumed its discussion
on the issue of destruction of smallpox virus stocks. The previous day
had seen some countries raise questions about a set of recommendations
from a WHO advisory committee that would have dramatically expanded research
on live smallpox virus.
South Africa took the floor first, reminding delegates of the WHA's previous
commitment to destroy the remaining live virus stocks, held in two labs,
one in the US and the other in Russia. Taking a strong stance, South Africa
called for research on the live virus to be stopped. It proposed the establishment
of a 'task team', with better balance and broader representation than
the Variola Advisory Committee (VAC). The 'task team' would evaluate the
status of work with live smallpox virus and its oversight.
South Africa called for a review of all the VAC recommendations, including
the genetic engineering of smallpox and the wider distribution of smallpox
DNA, as well as that to permit expression of smallpox genes in related
poxviruses, an item that the WHO Director General has already expressed
concern over.
Germany took the floor and made no reference to smallpox virus research.
In contrast, The Netherlands said that it was "quite concerned about
the dangers" of the proposed research, and was not satisfied that
adequate protections are in place. It questioned the need to genetically
engineer smallpox. The Netherlands called for an independent body to oversee
research and for reconsideration of the VAC recommendations.
Canada reminded delegates that any research on smallpox should remain
geared to precise results and be time-limited. Canada insisted that any
live virus research "must be essential for public health". In
this respect, Canada, expressed concerns that US research on antivirals
(linked to the proposal to genetically engineer smallpox) would be lengthy
and costly, asking "Is this really essential for public health?"
Like many other delegations, Canada was concerned about laboratory accidents
and the possibility of genetic engineering experiments resulting in a
more dangerous virus. Canada called for prompt destruction of the virus
and expressed support for China's request yesterday that WHO follow up
on the issue of fixing a new date for the destruction of smallpox virus
stocks.
The Pacific island nation of Tonga weighed in with a thoughtful intervention.
Concerned about the proposed widespread distribution of smallpox DNA,
Tonga observed that "too many hands on smallpox will enhance the
possibility of bioterrorism". Tonga also said that it is not convinced
that the prohibition on the synthesis of smallpox DNA was strong enough.
Tonga concluded that virus stocks should be rapidly destroyed and that
thereafter, possession of live smallpox virus should be made a "crime
against humanity".
In contrast to the prevailing
sentiment in the room, the US stated that it "agrees entirely with
Russia", which had yesterday called for even more live virus research
than the recommendations presented by the VAC. Noting the possibility
of undeclared smallpox stocks, the US said that its research is not finished
and that setting a date for destruction would be "arbitrary"
and "not at all warranted". In response to Canada, the US strongly
backed its antiviral research plans.
Apparently smarting from repeated references to lab accidents, the US
characterized the chances of an accident as "incredibly small"
and claimed that existing smallpox stocks are held at "the absolute
highest standards of biosafety and biosecurity". It is, however,
unclear to what standards the US referred because there are no international
lab biosafety or biosecurity standards, nor does the US have domestic
lab biosafety standards. Backing Russia, the US said that it believed
further sequencing of the Russian smallpox stocks is necessary for developing
diagnostics.
France, like Germany before it, made no remarks on smallpox virus research.
Cuba made a brief intervention mentioning laboratory accidents and calling
for a destruction date to be set. Cuba asked the WHO Executive Board to
develop a resolution to this effect.
Egypt then took the floor and briefly stated that it supports the research.
Saudi Arabia noted that sufficient sequencing and diagnostics research
has been conducted and that smallpox virus should no longer be retained
for these purposes. Saudi Arabia called for research and manipulation
of the live virus to be stopped and for a date for destruction to be set
as previously mandated by the WHA.
Pakistan expressed qualified support for live virus research, adding that
it is concerned about lab accidents. Pakistan called for the virus repositories
to be open to full inspection and for a comprehensive system of oversight.
Brazil supported the Secretariat's report as tabled, adding that research
results and diagnostic methods should be disseminated.
The UK supported ongoing research for the development of vaccines and
antivirals, adding that such research be outcome oriented and time limited.
However, the UK "strongly" shared the WHO Director General's
biosafety and biosecurity concerns about the VAC proposals. The UK said
that all research should be under WHO control and that live smallpox virus
should not be proliferated.
Zimbabwe supported South Africa's call for a more representative 'task
team' to reassess live smallpox virus work and its oversight. It supported
greater research transparency and for the WHA to be kept better informed.
Thailand reminded the WHA of its previous resolutions calling for destruction
of remaining stocks. Thailand expressed reservations about the ill-defined
limits of permissible research in the Secretariat's report. It was also
concerned about the proposed wider distribution of smallpox DNA and said
that such distribution should be decided by WHO on a case-by-case basis.
Ending the discussion, the United Arab Emirates said that the stocks should
be kept in well-guarded facilities.
Responding on behalf of the WHO Secretariat, Dr Asamoa-Baah noted the
Russian, Australian and US interventions. He took special note of the
"concerns and caution" about the VAC recommendations articulated
by the majority of countries. Dr Asamoa-Baah noted that countries had
asked for a review and revisit of the recommendations.
Committee A of the WHA which had discussed this issue then noted the Secretariat
reports and the agenda item was closed.
For more information see www.smallpoxbiosafety.com
BACK TO
MAIN | ONLINE BOOKSTORE
| HOW TO ORDER
|