Mixed reactions of elation and frustration
An overview of the Dubai climate outcomes

The COP 28 United Nations climate conference in Dubai, UAE, on 30 November–13 December brought together representatives of governments which are Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Paris Agreement. Meena Raman runs the rule over the major outcomes from the meeting – including a headline decision that doesn’t quite live up to its attendant fanfare – and what they entail for the effort to save an overheating planet.

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THE reactions to the outcomes of the Dubai climate talks were mixed. While some celebrated the first-time, historic mention of ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels’ in the decision adopted on the first global stocktake (GST), others expressed despair and frustration.

The small island developing states criticised the outcome as not going far enough in ambition, while other developing countries lamented the lack of equity in the decision, as it did not call on developed countries to take the lead in moving away from fossil fuels and with urgency. They were also disappointed that the means of implementation for their transition remain unfulfilled.

The hypocrisy of the developed world was most visible when it was clear that their expressions of elation over the Dubai decision were not matched by their actions on the ground. Instead of ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels’, developed countries in fact have plans for fossil fuel expansion up to 2050. 

Bolivia chastised developed countries ‘who talked a lot about keeping the 1.5°C temperature limit alive and about this goal being the “North Star”’, when they ‘have plans to expand fossil fuels until 2050, and are going against the very science that they have been talking about’. Bolivia called this ‘carbon colonialism’.

Bolivia’s assertions were supported by a recent report by Oil Change International (OCI),¹ which showed that the United States, Canada, Australia, Norway and the United Kingdom account for 51% of the planned expansion from new oil and gas fields through 2050. Four of these countries, excluding Norway, are amongst the top 10 historical contributors to the climate crisis based on their domestic emissions of heat-trapping greenhouse gases (GHGs) since the industrial era.

According to the OCI report, the US emerges as the worst culprit by far, accounting on its own for more than 37% or about one-third of the planned expansion, followed by Canada and Russia. In 2023 alone, the US administration approved the Alaska Willow Project; approved multiple liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facilities in Alaska and along the Gulf Coast; held a massive oil and gas lease sale in the Gulf of Mexico; fast-tracked the Mountain Valley Pipeline; and oversaw the weakening of environmental laws, making it easier for fossil fuel infrastructure to move forward. (See the article ‘Fossil fuel phase-out – hype and hypocrisy’ in this issue.)

Such actions are all antithetical to the professed claims of being ambitious in climate efforts.

The 1.5°C fallacy

The objective of the GST under the Paris Agreement (PA) is to conduct a periodic assessment of the collective progress of PA Parties towards achieving the accord’s purpose and its long-term goals. 2023 was set to be the first year for this, hence its significance. 

The Dubai decision on the GST, adopted by the fifth session of the Conference of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 5), was part of a package of decisions hailed as the ‘UAE Consensus’. It was gavelled very quickly by COP 28 President, Dr Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, on 13 December morning to a jubilant crowd in the plenary. (The conference overran its initial scheduled closure on 12 December.)

An elated Al Jaber said that all Parties ‘worked very hard to secure a better future for people and our planet’, calling the decision ‘our historic achievement, which we should be proud of’. He said the decision was a ‘comprehensive response’ with all the other adopted decisions, and that ‘we have confronted the reality and set the world in a right direction to keep the 1.5°C [limit on temperature rise] within reach, led by science’. He also said that an agreement was only as good as its implementation, and called on Parties to take the necessary steps.

Several climate experts and observers, including the Third World Network, have questioned the over-enthusiastic response of the COP 28 President and others who have praised the Dubai outcomes.

The decision adopted on the global mitigation efforts does not go far enough in keeping the 1.5°C limit within reach, as developed countries are not undertaking their fair share of emissions reductions today, including through halting the expansion of fossil fuel production with urgency.

With the plans for expansion of fossil fuels by several historical emitters up to 2050, the remaining ‘carbon budget’ to limit global warming to 1.5°C is likely to be busted very soon. As the 6th Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reveals, there is a carbon budget of only 500 gigatonnes left, and with current emission trends, this remaining carbon budget will be exhausted in this decade.

As pointed out by Indian experts, the focus of the mitigation efforts should have been on how the remaining carbon budget is distributed among countries, based on equity and the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDR-RC) between developed and developing countries, taking into account the historical and cumulative emissions of the former. (See the article ‘Sharing the carbon budget’ in this issue.)

This notion of fair shares in mitigation efforts has been advanced by climate justice movements as well as developing countries such as Bolivia, India, China and others, but has been ignored due to the resistance of developed countries. The rich world sees this as a top-down approach that dictates how much countries must do, rather than leaving it to a bottom-up process such as the ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) under the PA, with the latter being championed especially by the US.

COP 28 and CMA 5 also saw the adoption of other key decisions, which however did not quite make it to the limelight like the decision on fossil fuel transition.

Loss and damage fund

The decision on operationalising the loss and damage fund was adopted at the opening of the climate talks on 30 November. This move by the COP 28 President to have the decision adopted on the first day of the conference was unprecedented, clearly designed to start the COP on a very positive note, just ahead of the ‘World Climate Action Summit’ that was held on 1 December. The Summit saw the convergence of over 100 world leaders in Dubai, with many calling for more climate action. 

The decision on the loss and damage fund is indeed significant, given the intense and difficult negotiations which preceded it. Al Jaber said, after the adoption of the decision, ‘We have delivered history today. The first time a decision has been adopted on day one of any COP. The speed in which we have done so is also unique, phenomenal, and historic … Getting this done demonstrates the hard work of so many … who worked so hard to get us to this point. This is evidence that we can deliver. COP 28 can and will deliver.’ 

The decision was adopted without naming the fund but Al Jaber recommended that the board of the fund (once it is formed) would ‘take up the matter of a name for this fund for climate impact response.’

There was applause in the plenary hall which was followed by several countries pledging money to the fund, which initially totalled about $300 million, with the UAE and Germany announcing $100 million each. The pledges now amount to around $700 million, with the United States pledging a rather disappointing amount of $17.5 million, which is also subject to approval by its Congress.

The GST decision

In the GST process, developing countries had wanted, among other things: 

•       Recognition of the overuse of the carbon budget by developed countries and their historical responsibility;

•       Recognition of the pre-2020 implementation gaps (since the PA only addresses post-2020 obligations) primarily due to developed countries not meeting their obligations;

•       Recognition of the principles of equity and CBDR-RC between developed and developing countries;

•       Fossil fuel phase-out to be just and equitable, with developed countries taking the lead and with developing countries being provided with the means of implementation to do so.

What was finally agreed in respect of the above was as follows:

•       On historical emissions and link to the global carbon budget, the GST decision (in paragraph 25) states: ‘Expresses concern that the carbon budget consistent with achieving the PA temperature goal is now small and being rapidly depleted and acknowledges that historical cumulative net carbon dioxide emissions already account for about four fifths of the total carbon budget for a 50 per cent probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C’. This falls short of placing responsibility on developed countries for using up most of the global carbon budget in relation to the temperature goal.

•       On the pre-2020 gaps, paragraph 17 of the decision reads, ‘Notes with concern the pre-2020 gaps in both mitigation ambition and implementation by developed country Parties and that the IPCC had earlier indicated that developed countries must reduce emissions by 25-40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, which was not achieved’. This is an important acknowledgement of the non-achievement by developed countries of their obligations.

•       There are explicit references to the Convention and principles of equity and CBDR-RC in the preambular section of the decision and in a section related to ‘cross-cutting considerations’. However, the text has largely been toned down from earlier iterations, mainly due to opposition from developed countries, who had wanted minimal or no reference to the Convention, its principles or differentiation between developed and developing countries.

Renewable energy, fossil fuels, methane

The most focused outcome of the GST decision was in paragraphs 28 and 29, which read:

‘28. …recognises the need for deep, rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1.5°C pathways and calls on Parties to contribute to the following global efforts, in a nationally determined manner, taking into account the Paris Agreement and their different national circumstances, pathways and approaches:

(a) Tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030;

(b)    Accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power;

(c)    Accelerating efforts globally towards net zero emission energy systems, utilising zero- and low-carbon fuels well before or by around mid-century;

(d)    Transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science;

(e)    Accelerating zero- and low-emission technologies, including, inter alia, renewables, nuclear, abatement and removal technologies such as carbon capture and utilisation and storage, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors, and low-carbon hydrogen production;

(f)     Accelerating and substantially reducing non-carbon-dioxide emissions globally, including in particular methane emissions by 2030;

(g) Accelerating the reduction of emissions from road transport on a range of pathways, including through development of infrastructure and rapid deployment of zero- and low-emission vehicles;

(h)    Phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions, as soon as possible;

29. Recognises that transitional fuels can play a role in facilitating the energy transition while ensuring energy security’.

The decision does not mention ‘phase-out’ of fossil fuels but ‘transitioning away’ from them. Much ado has been made over this, but it appears to be more an issue of semantics than substance. However, not all fossil fuels are included here, as paragraph 29 allows for the role of ‘transitional fuels’ in the energy transition, which is seen to mean natural gas. Many view this as a major loophole.

Every country can decide according to its national circumstances what it will do in relation to the mitigation efforts above. Although the text here does not say that developed countries should take the lead and that the means of implementation are to be provided to developing countries, developing countries will insist, given that the Paris Agreement has to be taken into account, that this is the understanding that must be followed as per the Agreement.

A major issue however is exactly how ‘just, orderly and equitable’ transition away from fossil fuels is going to be determined and implemented, when every country will determine what it can do according to its own national circumstances. The same goes for how the other global mitigation efforts are going to be realised, given the national determination of such efforts. This is going to be a complicated issue.

Grave concerns have also been expressed over the technology solutions that should be accelerated, including nuclear and removal and abatement technologies such as carbon capture, utilisation and storage.

Speaking after the adoption of the GST decision, the representative of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) said that ‘the course correction needed has not been secured’ and that ‘we have made incremental advancement over business as usual’ but ‘what is needed is an exponential step change’.

AOSIS noted that there is no commitment to peak emissions by 2025, saying that the science cannot be ignored in this regard. Many other developing countries could not agree to a target of peaking emissions by 2025, due to the enormous challenge this would entail for them.

In relation to paragraph 28 of the text, AOSIS said ‘the exclusive focus on energy systems is disappointing’ and that sub-paragraphs (e) (on zero- and low-emission technologies) and (h) (on phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies) ‘potentially take us backward rather than forward’ and ‘we are being asked to endorse technologies that could result in actions that undermine our efforts’. It called for guardrails on this language (which could not be included as the decision had already been gavelled). 

Colombia said that the commitment to transition away from fossil fuels is important but there are loopholes in the decision which also have risks, adding that transition fuels (such as natural gas) will end up colonising the space of the decarbonisation.

In fact, Colombian Environment Minister Susana Muhamed had, earlier in the Dubai conference on 10 December, highlighted the challenges for developing countries when she said that ‘a new economic order that would help guide the economic and energy transition is required for addressing the challenge of climate change’. Addressing the challenges of transitioning away from fossil fuels, Muhamed shared the difficulties her country has faced in dealing with its own transition away from oil. She underlined the need for aligning the economic and financial system to this transition. (See the article ‘Fossil fuel phase-out in developing countries requires new economic order’ in this issue.)

Antigua and Barbuda said that reliance on transition gas is a dangerous loophole and that it is a fossil fuel that we need to transition away from. It raised alarm that this will take away investments from renewable energy, leaving poor developing countries with high energy costs and stranded assets.

Halting deforestation by 2030

Another important outcome from the GST decision is the first-time mention of halting and reversing deforestation by 2030. Paragraph 33 ‘emphasises the importance of conserving, protecting and restoring nature and ecosystems’, including through ‘enhanced efforts towards halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, and other terrestrial and marine ecosystems acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and by conserving biodiversity, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards, in line with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework’.

Concerns have however been raised by some developing countries as to how this is to be achieved if there are no financial resources to halt and reverse deforestation.  

Global goal on adaptation

While the GST decision and its provisions on mitigation efforts took most of the limelight at Dubai, less attention was paid to the decision on the global goal on adaptation (GGA). Governments had struggled to find consensus on the GGA framework, which meant that the final draft text from the COP 28 Presidency came only hours before the closing plenary, where the decision was finally adopted.

The GGA decision is significant as it gives a major thrust to the importance of adaptation from a global perspective.

Parties agreed to adopt ‘the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience’ and decided that its purpose ‘is to guide the achievement of the GGA and the review of overall progress in achieving it with a view to reducing the increasing adverse impacts, risks and vulnerabilities associated with climate change, as well as to enhance adaptation action and support.’

It was also decided that the Framework ‘should guide and strengthen efforts, including long-term transformational and incremental adaptation, towards reducing vulnerability and enhancing adaptive capacity and resilience, as well as the collective well-being of all people, the protection of livelihoods and economies, and the preservation and regeneration of nature, for current and future generations.’

Governments are urged ‘to increase ambition and enhance adaptation action and support, in order to accelerate swift action at scale and at all levels, from local to global, in alignment with other global frameworks, towards the achievement of, inter alia, the following targets by 2030, and progressively beyond:

(a)    Significantly reducing climate-induced water scarcity and enhancing climate resilience to water-related hazards towards a climate-resilient water supply, climate-resilient sanitation and towards access to safe and affordable potable water for all;

(b)    Attaining climate-resilient food and agricultural production and supply and distribution of food, as well as increasing sustainable and regenerative production and equitable access to adequate food and nutrition for all;

(c)    Attaining resilience against climate change related health impacts, promoting climate-resilient health services, and significantly reducing climate-related morbidity and mortality, particularly in the most vulnerable communities;

(d)    Reducing climate impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity, and accelerating the use of ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions, including through their management, enhancement, restoration and conservation and the protection of terrestrial, inland water, mountain, marine and coastal ecosystems;

(e)    Increasing the resilience of infrastructure and human settlements to climate change impacts to ensure basic and continuous essential services for all, and minimising climate-related impacts on infrastructure and human settlements;

(f)     Substantially reducing the adverse effects of climate change on poverty eradication and livelihoods, in particular by promoting the use of adaptive social protection measures for all;

(g)    Protecting cultural heritage from the impacts of climate-related risks by developing adaptive strategies for preserving cultural practices and heritage sites and by designing climate-resilient infrastructure, guided by traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples’ knowledge and local knowledge systems’.

The following targets in relation to ‘the dimensions of the iterative adaptation cycle, recognising the need to enhance adaptation action and support’, were also agreed to:

‘(a)   Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment: by 2030 all Parties have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities and have used the outcomes of these assessments to inform their formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, and by 2027 all Parties have established multi-hazard early warning systems, climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services;

(b)    Planning: by 2030 all Parties have in place country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, covering, as appropriate, ecosystems, sectors, people and vulnerable communities, and have mainstreamed adaptation in all relevant strategies and plans;

(c)    Implementation: by 2030 all Parties have progressed in implementing their national adaptation plans, policies and strategies and, as a result, have reduced the social and economic impacts of the key climate hazards identified in the assessments referred to in paragraph 10(a) above;

(d)    Monitoring, evaluation and learning: by 2030 all Parties have designed, established and operationalised a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts and have built the required institutional capacity to fully implement the system’.

The efforts to realise the above targets are to ‘be made in a manner that is country-driven, voluntary and in accordance with national circumstances; take into account sustainable development and poverty eradication; and not constitute a basis for comparison between Parties’.

Developing countries had also called for stronger language on adaptation finance and means of implementation that would require developed countries to scale up their contributions to developing countries in order to enable the latter to undertake adaptation efforts in response to the worsening impacts of climate change. Developed countries were resistant to this but the strong show of unity in the G77 and China developing-country bloc ensured strong language on the need to provide means of implementation. 

The most notable was in paragraph 32 of the GGA decision text: ‘Recognises that the extent to which the framework for the GGA is implemented by developing country Parties depends on, inter alia, engagement and action at all levels, and the effective implementation by developed country Parties of means of implementation and support commitments’.

In addition, it was agreed that further work will be conducted to assess progress towards the outlined goals in the GGA framework and to identify potential indicators and quantified elements of those targets, which comprehensively captures the views of developing countries with regard to further work on the GGA.

New collective quantified goal on finance

A decision was also adopted at Dubai ‘to enable the development of a draft negotiating text’ on setting the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance, which will be considered at CMA 6, to be held this November in Baku, Azerbaijan. 

The NCQG ‘ad hoc work programme’ will ‘build on the technical work conducted and the submissions made’ in 2023 and ‘allow for deliberations among Parties that are conducive to the development of a draft negotiating text’.

Developing countries had laid strong emphasis on the need to move into a ‘negotiation space’, going beyond the existing approach of holding technical expert dialogues (TEDs) on the NCQG. The thrust of their focus was on having a modality that would be ‘Party-driven’ to work on a ‘negotiated decision text’ that would be considered at CMA 6. Developed countries, on the other hand, while acknowledging the need for a negotiation space, had insisted on continuing with the modality of the TEDs for preparing a draft text by strengthening the dialogues.

Other decisions on finance

The Dubai talks adopted a host of other decisions on climate finance. Many of these decisions relate to ‘urging’ or ‘encouraging’ developed countries to meet their existing financial commitments, with little to show on actual delivery of climate finance.

The decision on long-term finance (LTF) ‘[n]otes with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilise jointly USD100 billion per year by 2020 … was not met in 2021’, and ‘welcomes the ongoing efforts of developed country Parties towards achieving the goal of mobilising jointly USD100 billion per year’.

The key political fights on finance had centred around developed countries trying to remove references to ‘developed country Parties’ in the context of those responsible for providing and mobilising finance for developing countries; emphasis by developed countries on moving away from a ‘bifurcated’ approach of differentiation; and undue focus on the private sector and multilateral development banks to deliver climate finance.

Apart from the specific decisions on finance, the GST decision also has a section on the finance element. Its paragraph 67 states the following: ‘Highlights the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties, … highlighting that such needs are currently estimated at USD5.8-5.9 trillion for the pre-2030 period’.

Paragraph 68 states: ‘Also highlights that the adaptation finance needs of developing countries are estimated at USD215-387 billion annually up until 2030, and that about USD4.3 trillion per year needs to be invested in clean energy up until 2030, increasing thereafter to USD5 trillion per year up until 2050, to be able to reach net zero emissions by 2050’.

Just transition work programme

One of the most contentious issues during the negotiations on the work programme on just transition pathways (JTP) had been over its ‘scope’.

Developing countries wanted the scope to be broad and cover all three pillars of sustainable development (social, economic and environmental) in the context of equity and CBDR-RC, while developed countries preferred it to be narrower and focus on the JTP for the workforce, primarily in relation to the energy transition, and also enhance ambitious domestic climate actions.

The final decision adopted caters to a broad scope. It was decided that ‘the work programme shall include the following elements:

•       Just transition pathways to achieving the goals of the PA outlined in Article 2.1, in the context of Article 2.2;

•       Just and equitable transition, which encompasses pathways that include energy, socioeconomic, workforce and other dimensions, all of which must be based on nationally defined development priorities and include social protection so as to mitigate potential impacts associated with the transition;

•       Opportunities, challenges and barriers relating to sustainable development and poverty eradication as part of transitions globally to low emissions and climate resilience, taking into account nationally defined development priorities;

•       Approaches to enhancing adaptation and climate resilience at the national and international level;

•       Just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities, including through social dialogue, social protection and the recognition of labour rights;

•       Inclusive and participatory approaches to just transitions that leave no one behind;

•       International cooperation as an enabler of just transition pathways towards achieving the goals of the PA’.

This final text has a measure of balance, with the coverage of national and international dimensions in its scope, in relation especially to adaptation and international cooperation. The ‘recognition of labour rights’ was also included in the scope of the work programme.

The decision also states that the implementation of the work programme will start this year under the Convention’s Subsidiary Bodies, and agrees to review the effectiveness and efficiency of the work programme and consider its continuation in 2026. This decision regarding the timeframe is seen as a compromise; developed countries did not want the work programme to continue beyond three years, while developing countries wanted a longer timeframe.

Prospects for 2024

Given the very important and significant decisions taken in Dubai, the road to the next climate conference (COP 29), which will be held in Baku this November, is expected to be a rocky one. This is supposed to be a critical year for an outcome especially on the new climate finance goal.

Whether developed countries will have the appetite for genuine international cooperation when it comes to meeting their financial obligations under the Convention and the PA remains to be seen, all the more so when there are key elections taking place this year, especially in the US, the UK and the European Parliament.

If Trump returns to the White House, the US is once again likely to turn its back on climate change and leave the PA, as was the case in the last Trump era. What little the Biden administration has done for climate change in the US would be gutted, and climate denialism will rule. In such a scenario, expectations of any contribution on climate finance from the world’s biggest historical polluter would be unrealistic. This would in turn pose a challenge for the rest of the rich world, who are not expected to plug any gaps left by the US.

On top of this, according to the Bloomberg news agency, the European Union’s climate future will depend on who can form a majority in the EU Parliament after elections in June. An energy crisis unleashed by the Ukraine war, high inflation and the rise of far-right parties, Bloomberg says, make it hard to continue championing climate ambition and green energy transition on the campaign trail.

Looming over all this is the ongoing genocide in Palestine and Western complicity in the Israeli aggression, which has exposed the ugly truth of Western disrespect for international law and human rights even as they preach otherwise to the rest of the world. Little wonder then that trust between North and South is at an all-time low.

Within this context, the outlook for real international cooperation on climate change looks extremely challenging and bleak.                                                             

Meena Raman is Head of Programmes at the Third World Network. This article was written with inputs from the TWN climate change programme team.

Notes

1.   ‘Planet Wreckers: How Countries’ Oil and Gas Extraction Plans Risk Locking in Climate Chaos’. Oil Change International, September 2023.

*Third World Resurgence No. 358, 2024/1, pp 9-15