Recovery
or reform?
G20 rift remains behind show
of unity
European leaders took their
crusade in favour of deficit cutting to the Group of 20 summit in Toronto in June. While the final communique
sought to conceal the unresolved differences within this group with
a compromise of sorts, it has definitely given a boost to the European
drive.
T Rajamoorthy
DESPITE attempts in their final
communique to paper over their split, it is clear that the leaders
of the Group of 20 (G20) major developed and emerging economies left
their recent Toronto Summit with their deep policy differences on fighting
the current recession wholly unresolved.
Even before the summit, these
differences had come out in the open when, to the consternation of the
Obama administration, Europe embarked on a frenzy of public spending cuts. To
the US
administration, this emphasis on fiscal probity, avowedly to overcome
the debt overhang reflected in gaping national budget deficits, represented
a clear abandonment of the policy focus on economic recovery by means
of stimulus packages agreed at the G20's London Summit in April 2009.
To a US administration ever conscious of
the mistake made by President Roosevelt in 1937 when he prematurely
abandoned a policy of economic stimulus to tackle the Great Depression
in favour of fiscal reform, such a course is clearly a risky one. Roosevelt
caved in to pressure from right-wing deficit hawks, and to an embattled
US administration
currently facing similar pressures, Europe's
change of course could hardly be welcome news.
Damage limitation
Fearful of increased domestic
pressure to change course in line with Europe,
the Obama administration decided on some damage limitation measures.
On 16 June, 10 days before the Toronto meeting, Obama wrote a letter
reminding G20 leaders of the London Summit decision 'to boost demand
and repair our financial systems', which he claimed had 'worked'.
While paying due obeisance
in his letter to the need 'to restore sustainable public finances',
he makes it clear that this is a goal to be accomplished 'over the medium
term'. In contrast, he is categorical that:
'Our highest priority in Toronto must be to safeguard and strengthen
the recovery. We worked exceptionally hard to restore growth; we cannot
let it falter or lose strength now. This means that we should reaffirm
our unity of purpose to provide the policy support necessary to keep
economic growth strong.'
Far from merely asserting the
need to stay the course, in his letter Obama goes on to make out the
case for a second stimulus package:
'In fact, should confidence
in the strength of our recoveries diminish, we should be prepared to
respond again as quickly and as forcefully as needed to avert a slowdown
in economic activity.'
Such a stimulus package has
long been urged by economists like Paul Krugman who fear that the recovery
cannot be otherwise sustained. The recent steep fall in the US housing
market may yet make such a course necessary, although it is not clear
whether Obama will be in a position to push through any such package,
given the growing domestic opposition to public spending.
Interestingly enough, in his
letter there is a not-so-veiled attack against Germany,
the leader of the deficit hawks, for its failure to pursue expansionary
policies despite enjoying a balance-of-payments surplus. In Obama's
words: 'I am concerned by weak private sector demand and continued heavy
reliance on exports by some countries with already large external surpluses.'
Although this is as much a criticism of China, it is equally a broadside against Germany, which has been highly critical of what
it calls the US
'addiction to deficit spending'.
At the Toronto Summit, Obama
received some strong support from India,
China and Brazil
on the dangers of the deflationary policies pursued by Europe.
India's
Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, endorsing the US assessment of the global economic
situation as 'still fragile', warned that simultaneous withdrawal of
fiscal stimuli by many countries 'could provoke a double-dip recession'.
'This,' he underscored, 'will have very negative effects on developing
countries, and on the prospects for achieving the Millennium Development
Goals.'
Chinese President Hu Jintao
said: 'We must act in a cautious and appropriate way concerning the
timing, pace and intensity of an exit from the economic stimulus packages
and consolidate the momentum of recovery of the world economy.'
Brazil also expressed concern at the
summit on the possible adverse impact of deflationary policies on developing
countries. Even before the summit, Brazilian President Lula da Silva
(who was finally forced to cancel his trip to Toronto because of serious
floods at home) had, through his spokesman, indicated that he would
call on the G20 countries to maintain their stimulus measures to boost
economic growth.
It is inconceivable that Obama
could have believed that his letter or the entreaties of these developing
countries would be sufficient to persuade the European leaders to abandon
their crusade against public spending. In any case, with US mid-term elections looming in which
public spending would figure as a major issue, he could ill-afford a
public spat with his European colleagues on this subject. Rather than
risk emerging from the debate as a public spending profligate, it was
in his own interest to leave the summit as a true believer in prudent
public spending.
Hence, the US effort was primarily directed to
ensuring that any schedule for budget cuts was more in the nature of
a goal for the future rather than a rigid deadline. More crucial was
the need to make sure that the time frame envisaged chimed with Obama's
previously announced timetable for US
budget cuts.
Toronto
outcome
The result is that the final
G20 communique commits 'advanced economies [to] at least halve deficits
by 2013 and stabilise or reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios by 2016'.
Additionally, the communique recognises that fiscal consolidation will
have to be 'differentiated for and tailored to national circumstances',
a phrase which affords not only the US
but Japan
(with its large budget deficit) even more wiggle room. The fact that
this commitment is only to be undertaken by the 'advanced economies'
spares the developing countries from having to embark on this traumatic
exercise.
The explicit recognition in
the G20 communique that the state of the global economy is 'uneven and
fragile' and that 'recovery is the key' cannot, however, disguise the
fact that Europe has succeeded in giving a push to the dynamics of development
in the advanced economies in favour of renewed fiscal belt-tightening.
The international sanction for such a policy is clearly a shot in the
arm for those seeking to roll back the worldwide reaction against market
fundamentalism. Of more immediate concern is the impact of these deflationary
policies on developing countries and whether it will trigger off the
much-dreaded 'double-dip' recession. In his most recent piece, written
in the aftermath of the Toronto Summit, Paul Krugman has warned that
the world is now in the early stages of a new depression because of
Europe's 'wrong turn in policy'. One can only hope he is
wrong.
T Rajamoorthy, a senior
member of the Malaysian Bar, is an Editor of Third
World Resurgence.
*Third World Resurgence
No. 237, May 2010, pp 21-22
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