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Info Service on Health Issues (May24/08) WHO: EU bullies developing countries to endorse proposal on “One Health” instrument Geneva, 9 May (TWN) – The European Union (EU) is bullying developing countries to accept the proposal to develop a legally binding instrument on a One Health approach as pressure mounts to conclude negotiations on a pandemic instrument. According to many developing country negotiators in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva, Germany and France openly threatened developing countries that in the absence of endorsement on a One Health instrument they would block the proposal to establish a Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) system, to facilitate the equitable sharing of benefits emerging from the research and development of pandemic-related pathogens. The draft negotiating text for the resumed ninth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) on the pandemic instrument contains this proposal. Article 5.4 states: “The modalities, terms and conditions and operational dimensions of a One Health approach shall be further defined in an instrument that takes into consideration the provisions of the International Health Regulations (2005) and will be operational by 31 May 2026”. There are no further details such as objectives, scope etc in the negotiating text. Up until the end of the 9th INB (19-28 March) there was no demand or proposal from any Member State for a separate instrument on One Health. Hence, there has never been a consideration of such an instrument until the resumed session that is taking place from 29 April to 10 May at the WHO Headquarters. Potential Scope of the Instrument The draft negotiating text of the resumed 9th INB session proposes the following definition: “One Health approach” means an integrated, unifying approach that aims to sustainably balance and optimize the health of people, animals and ecosystems. It recognizes that the health of humans, domestic and wild animals, plants and the wider environment (including ecosystems) is closely linked and interdependent”. This means the proposed instrument is broad in scope to cover the health of humans, domestic and wild animals, plants and the wider environment. Article 5.4 of the draft negotiating text has not given any further information on the objectives, purposes and scope of the proposed instrument. Though there are no clear explanations of the rationale behind the proposed One Health instrument from the INB Bureau, one of the research papers explains that the utility of the One Health approach is in the context of the prevention of pandemics. This research paper states : “Integrated One Health surveillance systems could contain data outlining risk factors for disease emergence in wildlife, livestock, companion animals, the environment (soil and water), and humans. Furthermore, data sharing agreements between governments and other relevant actors or the establishment or designation of dedicated hubs could ensure access to data. A recently created example of a collective and collaborative intelligence gathering and sharing initiative is the WHO Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence. Obligations to map zoonotic hotspots across the whole spectrum of animal populations within a Party’s jurisdiction -wildlife, livestock and companion animals – could also be considered, relying on standards, methodologies, criteria and targets issued by an authoritative body. Surveillance data could, in turn, feed into a science- policy mechanism (described below) that could support a Pandemic Instrument”. Further, the previous version of the draft negotiating text provides some insights on the One Health approach. For instance, Article 5.7 (d) of the Bureau’s text dated 2 June 2023 states: "Implement One Health surveillance mechanisms using data collected from and shared across human, animal, and environmental sources for the purpose of preventing and controlling the spillover of pathogens with pandemic potential between humans and animal populations, as well as between different animal species”. Though most of these provisions were removed in the later drafts the proposal to have an international legal instrument opens up concerns about imposing obligations on developing countries, which are known for their biodiversity, to invest in creating integrated surveillance systems and to share the data with developed countries. This kind of transfer of data from developing countries to developed countries has various serious implications, especially in trade. The main implications are listed below. Implications of the proposed instrument As mentioned above One Health is primarily aimed to prevent a pandemic by predicting the occurrence using data. This requires the sharing of huge amounts of data. The theory of change in the One Health Joint Plan of Action mentions three pathways. The third pathway emphasises data sharing. It states: "Pathway 3: Data, evidence and knowledge – encompasses the strengthening of the scientific evidence base, knowledge translation into data for evidence, technical tools, protocols and guidelines, information and surveillance systems”. The Joint Plan of Action has various pillars especially animal, food and environment that involve data collection and cross-border sharing. It states: “2.3.6 Build collaborative predictive epidemic intelligence systems (at national, regional and global levels) to identify high- risk interfaces and hotspots for spill over, incorporating relevant environmental and climate data and data on the establishment of reservoirs and vector species in new geographic areas”. Thus the implementation of One Health as envisaged under the Joint Plan of Action requires huge transfer of data from developing countries to developed countries, without any guarantee of anything in return especially benefits emerging from the processing and use of this data. A Royal Society paper sums up the implication of such data transfer in the context of zoonotic prediction technology as follows: “Another set of issues could arise around who benefits from zoonotic risk technology. It seems plausible that these technologies might mostly benefit from the research effort and data sharing occurring in tropical countries, where zoonotic viral diversity is believed to be highest. However, their development might mostly further the careers of researchers in high-income countries in North America and Europe, particularly if developed by experts who are unattuned to power dynamics in global health. Equally concerning, we identify a possibility that these tools will largely be developed as proprietary ‘risk assessment algorithms’ by corporate ‘data science for impact’ programmes, for-profit global health firms and non-profit organizations, just as they have been for the development of pandemic insurance programmes or similar analytics. In these circumstances, and without appropriate governance, the countries with the highest burden of zoonotic emergence might find their own data (repackaged in an analytic format) sold back to them at a premium by scientists and corporations from high-income countries.” The proposed instrument on a One Health approach not only reinforces inequity but also undermines the existing international obligations of States on access and benefit sharing under the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing. By imposing legal obligations to share data on pathogens or genetic resources the proposed instrument may undermine State sovereignty over genetic resources and bypass the obligations to share the benefit emerging out of the research and development on genetic resources and their data. Another concern is the use of such data to impose import restrictions citing sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. SPS is one of the frequently used trade measures by the World Trade Organization’s Members. A WTO paper states that “Specific trade concerns related to animal diseases and zoonoses, including emerging diseases, and their effects on trade, account for 35 per cent of all trade concerns raised in the SPS Committee. While some of these concerns are resolved quite quickly after being raised in the Committee, others can be more difficult to solve”. Even the outbreak of COVID-19 resulted in invoking SPS measures. The above paper reveals that “Since February 2020, several members have notified COVID-19-related trade measures, including 26 SPS measures. In an analysis of SPS and technical barriers to trade (TBT) notifications submitted by WTO members in response to COVID-19, the WTO Secretariat noted in May 2020 that initially, a few WTO members had imposed restrictions on imports or transit of certain animals and animal products, from affected countries, in some cases requiring sanitary certificates”. Thus, the One Health approach has implications for trade and livelihood. Many developing countries told Third World Network there is no mandate for the INB to propose a legal instrument on One Health approach. Many Member States opposed the proposal during the Working Group discussions on 8 May. Paragraph 4 of Article 5 after the Working Group discussions stands as follows: “[[The Parties shall further define] The modalities, terms and conditions and operational dimensions of a One Health approach [, including prevention,] [within guidelines to be agreed by the COP] [for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response supportive of and consistent with articles 4 and 5,] shall be further defined in a[n] [legally binding] instrument [operational no later than 31 May 2026 and] that takes into consideration the provisions of the International Health Regulations (2005) [the first of which shall be operational by 31 May 2026] [and will be [operational] [to be agreed] by 31 May 2026]]. Article 5 is to be negotiated during the Working Group discussion on 9 May afternoon (2.00 - 5.30 pm Geneva time) after the negotiations on Article 4.
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