TWN Info Service on Health Issues (Jul23/03)
21 July 2023
Third World Network

WHO: INB to continue with informal process without clarity on the first negotiation draft 

21 July 2023, Geneva (TWN) – The 6^th meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB6) mandated to negotiate a pandemic treaty has decided to continue with the informal process without much clarity to develop the first draft for negotiation. 

The point of contention is the reluctance of certain countries regarding the suggestion to incorporate textual proposals submitted by Member States, including on equity, into the Bureau’s text to develop it as a first negotiation draft.

WHO Member States, after finishing the first round of scheduled discussions on the Bureau’s text, proceeded to discuss the future work. However, they soon found themselves in a difficult position as no clarity emerged about the way forward. Although originally set for 21 July, discussions on next steps were taken up on 20 July evening, after cancelling another scheduled informal session on access and benefit sharing.

Though the INB6 discussions were based on the Bureau’s text, several Member State text proposals are currently omitted. This is not yet considered as an official negotiating first draft.  The Group on equity and many other developing countries had stressed the need to strengthen the equity provisions to start the negotiations during the plenary of the resumed fifth session, which took place on 12 to 16 June 2023.

The opening plenary session of the current INB session on 17 July heard several statements from Member States such as Namibia, Kenya, Bangladesh, and Nigeria which raised the concerns regarding the process by which several critical provisions relating to equity have been pushed to informal meetings even before the formal negotiating text is agreed upon.

Several developing countries that have substantive text proposals addressing issues such as diversification of production, access and benefit sharing, common but differentiated responsibilities, and financial mechanisms wanted their proposals to be incorporated into the Bureau’s text prior to the start of textual negotiations as happened in the case of the Working Group on amendments to the International Health Regulations (WGIHR) 2005.

But the discussions reached a roadblock on Thursday evening (20 July) when certain delegations who wanted to accelerate the process of development of the new pandemic instrument, without sufficient reason, tried to block the request to allow the insertion of textual proposals from Member States. The reason cited was that they think such incorporation of text will unnecessarily lengthen the negotiating text.

TWN learnt that based on the discussion this morning (21 July) the Bureau proposed a text which favours an approach to continue with informal meetings and mandate co-facilitators to improve the language taking into account the convergence in the informal meetings. Later the co-chairs agreed to include in the proposal, language suggesting that the informal meeting reports will not prejudice the right of Member States to propose further text as well as the current status of Member State proposals in the compilation document.

According to sources that European Union also supported the right for Member States to insert further text as they currently feel some of their proposals are also not adequately reflected.

Informal meetings will focus on Articles 4, 5 and 11 on pandemic prevention and public health surveillance, One Health approach, and co-development and transfer of technology and know-how respectively, along with the other provisions presently addressed in informal meetings (Articles 9,12, and 13). It is also learnt that the next informal meetings will be conducted alongside September meetings of the INB drafting group.

Faulty Alternative

Those who are opposed to the insertion of textual proposals to the Bureau’s text argue that these can be discussed in the informal meetings, and the co-facilitators of the informal groups could develop further text, taking into account the consensus reached during the informal meetings.

This alternative proposal has three problems.

First it effectively means that Member States who have substantive text proposals should discuss with the others, compromise on their text proposals, and allow some other delegations (who facilitates informal meetings) to develop a text for negotiations. This means making compromises even before negotiations start.

Secondly, several small delegations are not able to participate in every informal intersessional meeting. Fiji’s statement in the opening day plenary was explicit that several delegations are finding it difficult to attend the numerous informal sessions.

Thirdly, convergence and divergence in the informal meetings continue to guide the formal drafting group exercise and its roll-out. For example, after multiple rounds of informal meetings, there is little convergence on the issues associated with Articles 9 (research and coordination), 12 (access and benefit sharing) and 13 (supply chain and logistics). The divergence in these informal discussions is being used by developed countries to block the incorporation of developing countries’ text proposals relating to these articles into the Bureau’s text.

This process has started to undermine the trust in the INB, as developing countries are struggling double-fold that of the developed countries, even to get their text and ideas reflected in the Bureau’s text. While some of the developed country text proposals are also not reflected in the Bureau’s text, such exclusion has so far not affected the larger objectives of the developed countries.

The question on the purpose of informal meetings and their relationship with the development of negotiating text thus remains problematic. According to some delegations, rather than negotiating informally to develop a text for further negotiations, the better way to accelerate negotiations would be to compile Member States’ text and conduct formal and informal negotiations in order to achieve a better compromise on the said text. For example, in the parallel WGIHR process Member States engage in informal negotiations after compiling all the text proposals that are then published transparently.

One of the reasons cited for the acceleration of the INB process is the U.S. elections next year and the suspicion that if Donald Trump returns as President, he may initiate U.S. withdrawal from the WHO. This reason is as weak as it can be, because even if INB adopts the new pandemic instrument before the U.S. elections, and then the Trump comes into power and decides to withdraw the U.S. from WHO, it is still going to happen.+