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TWN
Info Service on Health Issues (May 11/01) Smallpox: Evidence Demonstrates
Significant Risk of Lab Accidents This informational briefing
clearly demonstrates that the risk of accidents at high containment
labs is significant, and that they occur with regularity, including
at the most highly secured and recently constructed lab facilities. With smallpox, the risk is proportional
to the length of time that smallpox is stored and the number of activities
that are conducted with the stocks. In other words, the longer
the World Health Assembly delays destruction of the stocks, and
the more research that is permitted, the higher the likelihood of
an accident. The upcoming World Health Assembly
(16-24 May, 2011) will be discussing the issue of smallpox destruction
once again. More information can be found at www.smallpoxbiosafety.org With best wishes,
Smallpox
Infobrief #3 Written
by Edward Hammond for the and
smallpoxbiosafety.org,
May 2011 Third
in a series of short informational briefings on the
issue of destruction of smallpox virus stocks Evidence
Demonstrates the Significant Risk “The "control of nature"
is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age of
biology and the convenience of man.” – Rachel Carson Will a smallpox accident happen
again? In general, viruses have a habit of evading the best efforts
of humans to control them, which makes the WHO’s eradication of smallpox
from the wild such a monumental achievement. Humans also make mistakes,
and despite robust systems and procedures, accidents at high containment
biological laboratories[1] occur with regularity.
With smallpox, the risk is proportional to the length of time that
smallpox is stored and the number of activities that are conducted
with the stocks. In other words, the longer that the World Health
Assembly (WHA) delays destruction of the stocks, and the more research
that is permitted, the higher the likelihood of an accident. Accidents in high containment
labs are far more commonplace than most people realize. In many countries,
including the It is periodically reported
to the WHA that WHO staff have inspected the facilities at the two
Collaborating Centres and determined that they are adequate. It
should be noted, however, that there are no international standards
for high containment laboratory facilities established by the WHO
or any other intergovernmental organization. Thus, there is no internationally
agreed baseline against which these facilities can be judged. In addition,
the WHO Biosafety Programme is quite small and unempowered, and is
understandably preoccupied with laboratory conditions in countries
with fewer resources than the US and Russia – for example, ensuring
that labs do not become ground zero for outbreaks of Ebola, polio,
or other diseases. The In 2004 at Vector, a researcher
infected herself with Ebola virus and died as a result. In 2007
and 2008 at the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC), primary and
backup power failed at high containment labs, indicating a loss of
all-important negative air pressure (used to keep germs in). Making
the accidents even more troubling, this serious design flaw in the
electrical system was identified by one of CDC’s own building engineers
during lab construction, but his repeated pleas that it be addressed
were ignored by management. The following charts provide
tabular information on historical smallpox accidents and recent laboratory
accidents (and other incidents) involving high containment labs. Generally
speaking, they can be divided into incidents involving human error
and equipment failure – or sometimes both. This information clearly
demonstrates that the risk of accidents at high containment labs is
significant, and that they occur with regularity, including at the
most highly secured and recently constructed lab facilities. Historical
Accidents Involving Smallpox Virus[2]
Some
Recent High Containment Laboratory Incidents
The reality of human and equipment
failures at high containment labs, including labs with the latest
technology and training, demonstrates the substantial risk of accidental
(or even deliberate) release of smallpox virus. These stocks no longer
serve any essential public health purpose, and the longer they are
retained, the greater the likelihood of an outbreak. [1]
By “high containment”, we refer to labs classified as biosafety level
three or four (BSL-3 or BSL-4), called P-3 or P-4 in WHO terminology.
P-3 and P-4 labs share many safety features, the main difference being
additional use of piped air supplies and full body “space suits” at
P-4. These labs are designed to host research on disease agents that
are easily transmissible and difficult or impossible to effectively
treat. While there are no actual international standards that assign
particular diseases to particular lab levels, it is widely agreed
that smallpox research requires a P-4 facility. [2]Tucker
J. 2001. Scourge. Grove Press. [3]
A synopsis can be found at: Enemark C 2006. Preventing Accidental
Disease Outbreaks: Biosafety in [4]
Young J 2008. CDC lab containing deadly virus suffers power outage.
[5]
Frase M 2009. The Price of Ike: UTMB in [6]Amerithrax
Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel 2011. Report of the Expert Behavioral
Analysis Panel. Research Strategies Network. See URL: https://www.researchstrategiesnetwork.org/pages/view/Amerithrax/ [7]
Associated Press 2004. Scientist dies after lab accident involving
Ebola virus. 24 May. [8]
Kaiser J 2007. Pathogen Work at
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