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ANTALYA CLIMATE NEWS UPDATE

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Developing countries oppose bid to limit just transition mechanism

Antalya, Nov 19 (Hilary Kung) – Developing countries in a united force under the **G77 and China** said strongly that they "will not accept a Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) that is simply a Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) 2.0 or an enhanced work programme."

Egypt for the **G77 and China** insisted that "we want a mechanism that will deliver and work in complementarity (with the JTWP)." These remarks were made during the last contact group of the JTWP held in Antalya on Wed 18 Nov.

It called for engagement on the G77 and China's "full-fledged proposal that directly responds to our mandate under decision 2/CMA.7".

The governance arrangements of JTM and what institutional links, if any, it should have with the JTWP, remains a central flashpoint in the negotiations. The **G77 and China**, supported by all its sub-groups, strongly pushed back against the proposals from developed countries that would curtail the mechanism's full potential.

Developed countries aligned around opposing new governance structures. The **European Union (EU)** called the constituted body a "red line", while **United Kingdom (UK)**, **Norway, Canada**, and **New Zealand** want to maintain a single contact group and avoid duplication or "complex architecture." Meanwhile, **Japan** opposed creating a steering committee or new financial arrangements, citing budgetary constraints.

The last contact group, Co-chaired by **Federica Fricano (Italy)** and **Joseph Teo (Singapore),** convened at 8 pm on Nov 18, to hear a report back from Parties on their informal-informal (inf-inf) discussions (without the Co-facilitators or observers) held to resolve divergences. **Chile,** which co-facilitated the inf-inf alongside **Canada,** noted that "persistent divergences" prevented a consensus and indicated that "further ministerial consultations are needed to help Parties reach a decision."

Parties then mandated the Co-chairs to produce a revised iteration of the text. With the Antalya talks set to conclude on Friday, Nov 20, the new draft is expected on Thursday, morning, Nov 19. The Co-chairs noted they will report back to the COP 31 Presidencies, saying that while the new iteration is under their own responsibility, the "new text would still require a lot of work" and the Presidency would take the work forward.

The first week of negotiations under the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) concluded with Parties agreeing to forward the informal note for further consideration during the final week

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under the CMA 8, recognizing that the text "carries no formal status, reflects divergent views rather than consensus, is non-exhaustive, remains open to revision, and neither captures all submissions nor prejudges future work." The Co-chairs released the first iteration of an informal note on Nov 13 after hearing Parties' views on the operationalisation of the JTM, review of the JTWP, and key messages from the 5th and 6th JTWP dialogues.

Technical negotiations continued from Nov 16 and extended to Nov 18, running alongside the high-level ministerial roundtable on just transition on Nov 16 and ministerial consultations held on Nov 17 to address outstanding political issues regarding the JTM, specifically on its "political and implementation arms," the timeframe for operationalizing the JTM, and its relationship with the JTWP.

Below are some key highlights on the interventions on JTM governance.

Egypt for the **G77 and China** noted that the group had already submitted its views and highlighted flexibility regarding a phased approach to operationalising the JTM. Warning against rushing operationalization under modalities proposed by developed countries that could fall short of delivering the full potential of JTM, Egypt stated: "We have to come to the reality [that] we might not necessarily finish everything at this session."

Elaborating further on its expectation of the new iteration of the text, Egypt said, "We must agree on an institutional structure that is instrumental in housing the functions. Agreeing on the functions [without a home for them] will not be helpful [to] deliver a functional mechanism. So, we really want to see all of these positions reflected in the next iteration clearly, even if they appear in the margins as G77 and China's options." This call was strongly echoed by developing country sub groups, including the **African Group,** the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Land-locked Developing countries (LLDC), Least Developed Countries (LMDC),** the **Arab Group,** the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), Brazil, Burkina Faso, Philippines,** and **Panama**.

In its earlier intervention providing an overarching comment on the draft text, the **G77 and China** emphasized that international cooperation is essential for achieving just transitions and must be reflected as a cross-cutting principle throughout the entire text. The Group emphasized that it has "consistently approached just transitions from the standpoint of fairness and equity, at the national level and, above all, at the international level". [See TWN Update 5 for more details on developing nations back two-tier just transition mechanism structure.]

The Group then expressed deep concerns that the text mentions international cooperation only twice: once, in the preamble and once among more than 40 dialogue key messages. Egypt noted that this omission is particularly troubling given last year's agreement that the core purpose of the JTM is "to enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge sharing, and to enable equitable, inclusive just transitions". This was also echoed by other sub groups.

Ghana for the **African Group** noted that while the draft text contains an option of establishing a steering committee, it omits details on its membership, selection process, rules of procedure, and a timeline for operationalising the JTM. To address this, it proposed nominating committee members by the 2027 June intersessional (66th session of the Subsidiary Bodies) (SB66), holding the committee's first meeting prior to CMA9 and adopting its first workplan at CMA9 in Nov 2027. Ghana also reiterated that the JTWP cannot be subjected to a sunset clause before fulfilling its mandate, pointing out that the 7th dialogue on international cooperation is still pending, and suggested that the work programme cannot be given an 'obituary' while its work remains unfinished. It also asked for the finance and the link to the high-level ministerial roundtable to be put back into the new iteration of the text.

Earlier, it had reiterated its support for a two-tier governance structure and proposed several targeted amendments, including tabling a JT finance framework to strengthen the proposed functions and modalities of the JTM to enhance international cooperation and enable countries to pursue equitable and inclusive just transitions. Ghana stated that the proposed JT finance framework aligns with Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement (PA), which mandates developed countries to provide climate finance to developing

nations, while emphasizing the need for public, grant-based, and highly concessional funding.

Ghana also rebutted concerns by developed countries on the proposal for a constituted body. First, it said that it heard some concerns from developed countries that having a constituted body in the policy or political tier may duplicate para 21 of the draft text which refers to the implementation-support tier. It said that "it will not duplicate as you need support", clarifying that para 21 concerns the supporting unit while para 20 relates to Parties who will be the steering committee.

(Para 20 in the text states that, "Further decides that the mechanism shall comprise two [tiers][dimensions]: a Party-driven policy [tier][dimension], in the form of a [joint contact group][steering committee with equitable geographical representation], and an implementation-oriented [tier][dimension] with meaningful engagement of non-Party stakeholder in both [tiers][dimensions] as appropriate [including through inclusive implementation-focused groups]. Para 21 refers to the three different options of how the implementation-oriented tier of the JTM should operate, whether with the support of UNFCCC secretariat only, a host or through existing constituted bodies, expert groups and work programmes)

Explaining further, it cited examples like the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB), the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) and the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI), commenting that "a mechanism without anyone to steer is a web page".

Second, on the concerns by developed countries of the extra cost incurred with setting up a new constituted body, the Group said that a new constituted body requires no new funds, citing the example of the that KCI which has run for years with minimal cost.

Third, regarding the developed countries' proposal for the JTM to focus on mainstreaming across existing bodies, the Group said it agreed that "existing bodies must carry out the work [but the issue is over] fragmentation, adding that the proposed constituted body would "make the mainstreaming accountable to the CMA."

On stakeholder engagement, it said a Party-driven body can welcome workers, youth, Indigenous Peoples and local communities as advisory observers.

As to the statement by developed countries that just transition is for all, so there are no functions exclusively for developing countries, it pointed out that Convention and the PA differentiate support, with support provided to developing countries in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the PA.

Chile for **AILAC** said that para 20 is the most contentious issue and call for ensuring the meaningful inclusion of non-Party stakeholders in the proposed two-tier governance of JTM. It also proposed adding an "implementation focus group" in the proposed governance of JTM in para 20 and also said that it prefers a "phased approach" in operationalizing the mechanism. Chile also said that there is a need for the draft text to explain the objective of the proposed workplan for the JTM.

Ethiopia for the **LDCs** said "[we] must leave Antalya with a mechanism". While it prefers to operationalise the JTM in Antalya, it remained "flexible with a phased approach [so long as the] decision is clear on what must happen in 2027, to ensure that it is fully operationalised next year (at COP32)". On the governing body, it reiterated its proposal for an advisory board and emphasised representation of LDCs and Small Island Developing States (SIDs) in the board. It also reiterated its priority that the mechanism should "facilitate access" [to the means of implementations] and "mobilise grant-based support", and that the implementation-support unit should not be limited to the [UNFCCC] secretariat.

Saudi Arabia for the **LMDC** said it also view that the mechanism's Party-driven policy tier should constitute of an "advisory board", with "members of balanced geographical representation, to initiate the workplan of the support tier and report its workplan in an annual report to the contact group and CMA".

Botswana for the **LLDCs** reiterated its backing for a two-tier governance structure, and emphasized the unique circumstances faced by LLDCs. It also

highlighted its support for African Group's proposal of a finance framework, saying that the institutional arrangement and support should respond to the different circumstances and barriers faced by LLDCs.

Fiji for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** also called for a two-tier structure.

Egypt said in its national capacity that it "sees value in having two contact groups" because if JTWP is completely integrated into JTM, (then in this case), we will be having one contact group; but if we are following a phased approach, we see it more sensible since we may not be deliver a full and comprehensive JTM and the need for two contact groups viz. one for JTWP and the other one for JTM operationalisation. This phased approach is the most prudent and sensible as we go forward."

China highlighted that given the consensus among developing countries in favour of a constituted body, language reflecting this should be included under the modalities and functions paragraphs. It urged the Co-chairs to consider adding this text, even in brackets, in the next iteration. It also reiterated its suggestion to include a new language in the preamble, which is to emphasise that all JT workstreams, including the JTWP, should guarantee justice, fairness and equity in transition among nations, so that the transition narrows, rather than widen the North-South gap. Earlier, it also proposed developing a dedicated constituted body, viz. an advisory body or implementation committee to facilitate and implement JTM activities.

The **EU** said "[establishing a] constituted body is a red line". Responding to the African Group's proposal for a dedicated finance framework, the EU that this is also a "red line". Explaining further, it said a "constituted body needs its own funding and additional overheads; instead, it proposed mainstreaming just transition into other existing constituted bodies. On the means of implementation (MOI), it commented that MOI is already addressed in other for a (referring to the Climate Finance Work Programme). It also rejected any additional functions for the JTM to serve exclusively for developing countries, arguing that just transition is for all countries.

Earlier, the EU made clear that under no circumstances would it accept two parallel contact groups for the JTWP and the JTM. Elaborating further, it said "the text gives impression that there are two parts of JTM but this is not what we suggested".

The EU proposed establishing a five-year workplan to serve as the operational backbone of the JTM, alongside a single contact group, tasked with delivering its functions and activities. Elaborating further, it said there is "no need for a steering committee nor the need to establish a network", and that the secretariat can have a clearer role to help facilitate the existing resources, expertise and initiatives including helpdesk, training centre that can help with several functions of JTM.

It also said that this would allow the JTM to be operationalised and avoid a "phased approach". It envisioned that the workplan of the JTM can be adopted next year at CMA9. "[The] robustness [of JTM] must be measured by its impacts, and not the institutional architecture it creates, said the EU, while emphasising that JTM must be action-oriented in responding to the implementation gap and support countries in delivering the 1.5 C-aligned JT pathways.

The **UK** also agreed that the JTWP should be fully integrated into the JTM rather than creating more duplication, saying that "[we should] not simply create complex architecture". It also called for the JTM to be fully operationalised in Antalya, rather than delaying it.

Responding to the new text which will be prepared by the Co-chairs, **Norway** said it trusts the them to "bring us (a text) that is closer and not apart".

Canada also supported integrating the JTWP into JTM, saying that this way we would have one contact group… otherwise, it would risk duplicating decision-making if there are two contact groups. Canada also said that there should be a single work plan for JTM, and it should include the JTWP dialogues.

Japan stressed that achieving the 1.5°C target is essential and requires accelerating action and just transitions to decarbonize society. It noted that it prefers integrating the JTWP into the JTM and supported the point of views from the EU, Canada and UK. Explaining further, it said "incorporating the JTWP into JTM will (enable the mechanism) to function with complementarity and avoid

fragmentation within the only one JT ecosystem. It said it also prefers one contact group.

Japan commented that there is a need to take into account the budgetary implications and said that “steering committee and other financial arrangements will not be the best solution in view of the budgetary constraints” and also “not feasible from the sustainability [point of view] of the UNFCCC”. It said, “[we] have to recognise the reality of the system and streamlining budgets and activities and focussing on what countries truly need" instead”.

New Zealand also concurred that integrating the JTWP into JTM is the most practical and effective [option which also] reduces the risk of duplication. It also made clear that it does not support a two-tier structure as it risks losing integration and coordination.

Meanwhile, cross constituency observer organisations sent an open letter to developed countries and the ministerial pairs (Poland and Mexico who are responsible for the JT matter), calling for a permanent UNFCCC institutional arrangement for JT implementation, with seats for observers and rights holders, backed by strong functions and modalities to scale up MOI, and a clear process to fully operationalise the mechanism by CMA9/COP32.

Over the two weeks, Parties also discussed the key messages from the 5th and 6th dialogues, alongside the modalities, functions, and timelines for the JTM. More details, including the final outcome, will follow in the future update.