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Parties clash over adaptation finance re: global goal on adaptation

Antalya, 16 November (Jinghann Hong) - Negotiations on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) saw familiar faultlines emerge between developed and developing countries resurface at the Antalya climate talks.

A significant flashpoint was the issue of tripling adaptation finance, where developing countries led by the **G77 and China** called for an outcome to advance its operationalisation, including by providing clarity on the baseline and trajectory, as "a goal without a baseline, a trajectory and a means of tracking is not one that developing countries can plan against." The G77 and China was also opposed to a "No text" option on adaptation finance proposed by developed countries, which it said was unacceptable. (See details below.)

The informal consultations were co-facilitated by **Cornelia Jaeger (Austria)** and **Ruleta Camacho-Thomas (Antigua and Barbuda)** under the 65th session of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB65) held from Nov 9–14. Parties were tasked to take forward a substantial mandate covering several workstreams, including but not limited to progressing work under the Belém–Addis Vision (BAV) on adaptation, the Baku Adaptation Road Map (BAR) and the terms of reference for the review of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience (UAE FGCR). (See details on background on these items below.)

Informal consultations with the ministerial pairs appointed to deal with adaptation matters were convened on Tuesday, Nov 17, with Parties being asked to provide views on the following: first, on what proposals do they have that would move all towards consensus on key elements of the GGA decision, including on means of implementation; and second, what could the Presidency-initiated cover decision include to elevate and accelerate adaptation action, including on NAPs, adaptation gaps and early warning systems? The ministers appointed with this task are Jiwoh Abdulai, Minister for Environment and Climate Change, **Sierra Leone** and Miatta Fahnbulleh, Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero of the **United Kingdom.**

Meanwhile, technical negotiations on the GGA text are continued under **Cornelia Jaeger (Austria)** and **Ruleta Camacho-Thomas (Antigua and Barbuda)**, as was the case in the first week.

(Established at CMA 7, the BAV on adaptation comprises of a two-year policy alignment process by Parties - testing of the 59 Belém Adaptation Indicators [BAI] by Parties at their discretion, alongside making use of these

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Indicators as appropriate and as relevant in, reporting and planning processes, including in their Biennial Transparency Reports [BTRs], Adaptation Communications, National Adaptation Plans [NAPs], Nationally Determined Contributions [NDCs] and National Communications [NCs} - together with technical work on improving metadata and methodologies for the BAI, undertaken by the SBs and via an establishment of a technical task force to contribute to that work.)

(The BAR was launched at CMA 6 with the aim of advancing progress in line with Article 7.1of the Paris Agreement [PA] and supporting the implementation of the elements outlined in para 38 of decision 2/CMA.5. CMA 6 had also requested the SBs to develop modalities for work under the Road Map. At CMA 7, Parties also decided that the first phase of the BAR, covering 2026–2028, would focus on the initial implementation of activities under the Road Map. These would comprise two workshops per year, convened by the Chairs of the SBs, with the support of the secretariat, alongside a technical paper to be prepared by the secretariat. The technical paper is aimed at enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening cooperation and facilitating adaptation planning and implementation in line with different national circumstances and in the context of Article 2.1(a) of the PA relating to the temperature goal).

(The UAE FCGR was established under decision 2/CMA.5 at CMA 5, comprising 11 core targets split into 7 thematic targets and 4-dimensional [iterative cycle] targets. At CMA 7, Parties decided to undertake a review of the BAI as part of the review of the UAE FCGR in 2029, after the second Global Stocktake [GST], and further decided that the SBs will develop and agree in 2026–2027 the terms of reference for the review of the Framework.]

PARTIES DIVIDED OVER THE GGA

The forwarded draft text (version 13 November) which Parties had agreed to work from this week broadly consists of 6 buckets: (i) Opening paragraphs/preamble; (ii) BAV, which is further subdivided into policy alignment process, technical task force, composition, outcomes, modalities; (iii) BAR; (iv) second GST; (v) terms of reference for the review of the UAE FCGR; and (vi) means of implementation (MOI)/ adaptation finance. Amongst these items, there were a number of significant issues that Parties extensively negotiated on, some of which are elaborated in greater detail below.

CONCERTED CALLS FOR ADAPTATION FINANCE

Calls to "tripling the doubling" in adaptation finance were made loud and clear by developing countries, led by the **G77 and China**. ["Doubling" here referring the reference point from which adaptation finance is to be measured and delivered, i.e., the USD 40 billion commitment made by developed countries in Glasgow to double adaptation finance by 2025 per para 53 of decision 1/CMA.7]. Maintaining its longstanding position that MOI is integral to achieving the GGA and must be provided in accordance with Articles 9.1, 10 and 11 of the PA, the G77 stressed the urgency of its full delivery and urged developed countries to increase the trajectory of collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries. It also said that adaptation finance must be adequate, predictable and accessible.

In the context of declining development assistance from developed countries, the G77 had also earlier expressed concerns about the insufficiency, inaccessibility and very low availability of climate finance, noting that climate finance resources were at their lowest and insufficient to address the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries. It pointed out that the Global Environment Facility's (GEF) ninth replenishment for 2026–2030 represented a 27% decline from GEF-8, making it the lowest replenishment in 16 years. It also noted announcements by developed countries that they would cut their signed contributions to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) for 2024–2027 by half.

In the very first informal consultations, the **African Group** clearly outlined a comprehensive proposal for further work on the issue. Beyond calling for a decision articulating para 53 of decision 1/CMA.7, it also wanted a decision that clearly recognises common understandings of reference levels and of methodologies for monitoring and reporting on adaptation finance, as is necessary for transparency, predictability and effective review of progress.

The African Group also wanted Parties to consider: options for a reference level and base year for tripling adaptation finance; the scope of finance to be counted, including the treatment of public and private finance, finance provided and mobilised, financial instruments and grant-equivalent accounting; methodologies for attributing multilateral outflows to developed countries and avoiding the double counting thereof; monitoring and reporting arrangements for progress, including under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) and biennial communications under Article 9.5 of the PA; and linkages with para 16 of decision 1/CMA.6 [which refers to reporting on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG)].

It wanted the Secretariat to prepare a technical paper on options for reference levels and methodologies for monitoring and tripling, including the quantitative implications of each option. It also proposed requesting the Secretariat to organise a workshop in June 2027 on these matters, with the participation of Parties, the SCF, the Adaptation Committee (AC), operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, multilateral development banks and observers.

Furthermore, the African Group proposed a decision encouraged developed countries to provide disaggregated information on adaptation finance in their BTRs and biennial communications under Article 9.5, as well as on their plans to increase the provision of adaptation finance by 2035.

Group of Sur, said that "the credibility of climate multilateralism was at stake if Parties failed to deliver on what they had agreed just a few months earlier in Belém." It additionally proposed to request the SCF to include progress towards tripling adaptation finance flows, starting in 2028, and also to produce recommendations for a common methodology to track adaptation finance, including flows aligned with the targets under the UAE FCGR.

The **Dominican Republic** for **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)** acknowledged that the figure of USD120 billion target by 2035 "fell short of developing countries' needs."

Chile for **Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)** said that it did not support any mention on "enabling conditions" in the MOI section, as this puts the burden on developing countries to establish conditions to implement the GGA framework, where what is needed by developing countries is MOI to establish both the "enabling conditions" and to achieve and implement the BAI and GGA.

Sudan for the **Least Developed Countries** (LDCs) said that a "No text" option on MOI was a redline and that it was "frankly disrespectful" to developing countries who are doing their best to survive this crisis not to have any finance.

Saudi Arabia for the **Arab Group** stressed that adaptation "could not run on ambition alone" and that MOI was needed to turn plans into implementation.

China for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** regretted that the tripling of adaptation finance, which was essential to developing countries' adaptation action, had not been taken up for substantive discussion under the agenda of this [GGA] session. Describing it as "an important political commitment that developing countries had fought hard to secure", the LMDC called for a clear roadmap and timeline to increase the share of grants, as well as a progress-review mechanism to track the delivery of developed countries' commitments under Articles 9.1, 10 and 11 of the PA.

Earlier in the week it had also said that it was firmly opposed to attaching conditionalities to international support, such as "linking support to private sector participation or to the domestic policy environments or budgetary allocations of developing countries." It stressed that international public climate finance remained the primary and indispensable driver of adaptation in developing countries.

The **United Kingdom (UK)** for the **Umbrella Group (UG)** said that it would continue to take adaptation finance forward and was "far from complacent, remaining committed to tackling finance at a systemic level in the international system." The UG stated that the best place for substantive discussions was within the finance tracks and the broader context of the NCQG, while the adaptation agenda should focus on the technical and policy levers for implementation. The UK also said it wanted to have a substantive

conversation on adaptation finance, consistent with the decisions made in Belém, and that it would have welcomed explicit recognition that adaptation would be an important part of discussions under the Climate Finance Work Programme (CFWP).

The **European Union (EU), Japan, Mexico/Switzerland** for **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)** and **Canada** were also of the view that substantive discussions on finance should take place in the finance negotiating rooms under the CFWP. The **EU** added that it had proactively offered to follow up on the tripling commitment through the SCF and the NCQG, and was ready to deliver on commitments in the context of the NCQG and adaptation finance. It also said that it did not support references to common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).

Canada also pointed out that discussions on adaptation finance could and should take place under the CFWP. It recognised that CFWP discussions were still ongoing and therefore considered it inappropriate to include a paragraph that spoke to the matter at this stage. Canada said that "enabling conditions" are not about "shifting responsibility to developing countries" but that institutions, governance, systems, capacity-building, knowledge and technology are essential to accelerating effective outcomes - not just finance.

BELÉM–ADDIS VISION ON ADAPTATION (BAV)

One issue that saw the most divergence was the composition of the task force and the role of Parties in the technical work track of the BAV. Though there was some convergence amongst Parties on the experts in the technical task force being nominated by UN regional groups, in addition to the above, the **(AOSIS)** and **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)** wanted more than 1 representative for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and LDCs respectively.

The **Group of Sur**, **AILAC, LDCs, UG,** and **Japan** also preferred "the Chairs of the SBs to select additional experts recommended by UN organizations and other non-Party stakeholders to ensure balanced representation of expertise across the thematic and dimensional targets under the UAE FGCR, including expertise reflecting different knowledge systems and knowledge holders." This was also objected to by the **(LMDC)**.

South Africa for the **African Group** wanted a Party-led process and strongly said that its redline for the technical task force would be "a process led by international organisations" and "a process led by one constituted body" [referring to a proposal where the task force is led by the Adaptation Committee (AC) detailed below].

This stood in contrast to the position preferred by the **European Union (EU)**, who said that it did not support Parties being members of the task force, preferring experts, including those from UN agencies, to play a lead role. **Canada** also echoed the view that the work of the task force must remain "expert-led and technically independent", and additionally said that it supported the inclusion of UN agencies and non-Party stakeholders in the task force.

AILAC proposed a group of 12 Party representatives who would oversee and provide guidance to the technical task force but not be a part of it.

The **Arab Group** took the view the AC was well placed to lead the work, in collaboration with the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) and the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), as this would be practical and time-efficient, make use of existing arrangements of constituted bodies established under the Convention and the PA, preserve Party oversight and provide a realistic pathway to deliver the outcome on time. It additionally said that it did not support outsourcing the work to international organisations or experts under the UAE–Belém process, noting that many experts from its region were not available and this lack could undermine the institutional balance of the technical work.

The **Russian Federation** also supported this view, stating that it was the "fastest way to start technical work", and "it does not come at the expense of expertise", cautioning that expertise was readily available "without time to negotiate seats".

BAKU ADAPTATION ROAD MAP (BAR)

Another contentious issue was the scope of the BAR, namely over para 28 of the Mutirão decision,

the divergence of which was also reflected in the choice of BAR workshop topics. There was also a matter of whether to re-open submissions to inform the BAR workshop topics, given previous wrangles in SB 64. [For more on this, see TWN Bonn Climate News Update No. 6.]

[Para 28 of decision 12/CMA.7 reads, "…the work under the BAR shall be guided by the following: (a) Aligning adaptation action with adequate adaptation responses in the context of the temperature goal of the PA, ensuring that national and global adaptation strategies and actions reflect the risks and needs arising from different warming increments within the temperature goal; (b) Strengthening implementation of the targets …(c) Enhancing knowledge-sharing; (d) Ensuring access to means of implementation for adaptation, for adequate, predictable and accessible financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support, including from developed country Parties to developing country Parties, in accordance with Article 9, and Articles 10–11, of the PA."]

Earlier in week one, **Sri Lanka** for **G77 and China** had said that work should be guided by para 28 and all its elements "as agreed in Belém, without reinterpretation." With regard to MOI, the Group said that it should be addressed in a dedicated workshop, in line with paragraph 28(d) of decision 12/CMA.7. It also said that modalities for the workshops need to be strengthened.

The **African Group, AILAC, Group of Sur, LDCs, LMDC** and **Arab Group** also agreed on the need to invite Parties to submit new workshop topics, with a variety of suggestions of possible workshop topics for 2027, including with finance being treated as a cross-cutting consideration across the different workshops; focus on MOI as a standalone workshop where Parties could engage fully with the issue, as there was a need to understand the quality and quantity of adaptation finance implementation.

South Africa for the **African Group** also articulated its redlines for the BAR, including "a process where there is no guidance or engagement on MOI" and "a process where we just come and talk and not capture what we are engaging on".

On the other hand, the **EU, UG** and **Japan** did not want to reopen submissions for workshop topics given that this had already come to pass last year.

Norway said that it considered the mandate to have already been agreed and noted that Parties had submitted their views, but remained open to a further round of submissions if Parties saw value in this, though cautioned that it did not think Parties should be agreeing on future workshops here. In that, Norway called for a focus on how to operationalise the UAE FCGR and strengthen adaptation action on the ground, as well as how to enhance coherence across the adaptation architecture.

AOSIS observed that there was no consensus on the list of topics and while in the first week initially supported revisiting the focus of workshops in 2027 and 2028 through another call for submissions immediately following this COP, in the second week in an attempt to show flexibility, proposing that the SB Chairs to select topics based on submissions already received from the previous round of submissions.

On capturing the outputs of the BAR, in week one there was a variety of suggestions on how to do so, from individual workshop reports, to annual reports, to a conclusion report for the end of BAR phase one. Parties remain divided on these outputs, notably with the **EU**, **AILAC** and **Japan** preferring a "No text" option to the BAR phase one conclusion report. Additionally, **Group of Sur** and **AOSIS,** while supporting the BAR phase one conclusion report, said that they do not see the reports or outputs for the BAR as input to the GST-2. On modalities, the **LDCs** also called for a more interactive workshop format to facilitate genuine exchanges, rather than relying primarily on presentations.

In response to the **EU** who viewed the expedition of technical task force [above] as the "central task" to the GGA negotiations as the BAR is "up and running" and thus "not a priority in Antalya", the **Arab Group** requested that all elements under the GGA, including the BAR and BAV, be treated and reflected on an equal footing in any iteration of the draft text. It stressed the need to maintain a clear distinction between the BAR and BAV, and said it would not accept text that reflected one more prominently than the other.

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE REVIEW OF THE UAE FGCR

Notably, the **Group of Sur** indicated that while it was not opposed to a call for submissions, but that it considered that the discussion on the terms of reference was "premature" and "politically and methodologically incorrect" given that the metadata and methodologies for the BAI had yet to be finalised.

The **AGN, LMDC, Arab Group, AOSIS, EU, Russian Federation** and **Japan** were open to launching the work on this matter and receive submissions from Parties and observers on the scope of the terms of reference.

NEXT STEPS

At the end of the last informal consultation, **Luke Millar** for the **Australian Presidency** took the floor to outline next steps: "The Co-facilitators, in collaboration with the Secretariat, and the Presidency, will work on text based on …the informal consultations, and taking into account the Ministerial Consultations…", adding that there is a "desire to come to consensus."