



## Just transitions: progress in Bonn but real test lies at COP 31

Kuala Lumpur, 24 June (Hilary Kung) – The Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) was among the first agenda items concluded during the recently ended 64th sessions of the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) in Bonn. The swift resolution was driven by the persistent efforts of developing countries, the consensus-building leadership of the Co-chairs, **Joseph Teo (Singapore)** and **Federica Fricano (Italy)**, and the unwavering pressure from civil society organisations [CSOs] highlighting that the stakes were too high to delay a conclusion.

The SB64 session [concluded](#) with Parties agreeing to the terms of reference (TOR) for the 2026 JTWP review (contained in the annex to the conclusions) and which also transmitted an [informal note](#) prepared by the Co-chairs under their own responsibility, with a disclaimer that “the content is...preliminary, has not been agreed, is not exhaustive....and does not prejudge further work or prevent Parties from expressing their views at any time”.

(For context, the Dubai [decision 3/CMA.5](#) mandated the review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the JTWP and consider its continuation in Nov. 2026 at COP 31 in Antalya, Türkiye, while the Belem [decision 2/CMA.7](#) last year requested SB 64 to develop the TOR for the review. While this year’s primary focus is on operationalising the Just Transitions Mechanism

(JTM), it also marks the scheduled review of the JTWP.)

At the start of the Bonn talks in the first week, developed countries sought approaches to delay and restrict the JTM’s operationalisation through insisting that a mapping exercise be considered first, to inform the structure of Mechanism or even to see if a JTM is needed at all. (See [TWN Update 5](#)).

During the final contact group meeting on June 17 ( a day before the conclusion of the Bonn talks), negotiations broke down over two key issues: the final outstanding issue in the TOR which concerns proposals from developed countries who sought to include areas of complementarity and coherence between the JTWP and other UN instruments, initiatives, and processes and **African Group’s (AG)** proposal for additional intersessional space to advance discussions on operationalising the JTM. To find convergence, Parties entered a 45-minute huddle before reconvening later late afternoon. In a final attempt to break the deadlock, the Co-chairs introduced a bridging proposal and appealed to Parties to “save the TOR”. This plea was echoed by most of Parties and observer constituencies. Ultimately, **Saudi Arabia’s** last-minute intervention agreeing to the proposal to “save the TOR”, drew applause from the room, while the **European Union (EU)** requested

additional time to coordinate internally. When the contact group reconvened at around 5.40 pm with this remained the sole outstanding issue, the EU said it would accept the latest iteration of the text on the TOR in the spirit of compromise. This saw a huge relief in the room which signalled progress on the JTWP.

The Co-chairs' bridging proposal for para 6(d) of the TOR, which was adopted by the SBs reads as follows: "The review (of the JTWP) will be informed by ...(d) "The mapping of relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement [PA] and relevant entities in the United Nations [UN] system and the synthesis report to be prepared ..., including areas of complementarity and coherence if any".

As for the intersessional work, the adopted SB conclusion, para 10 provides that "The SBSTA and the SBI invited the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies to consider informal intersessional work on the issues under these items, prior to SB 65, in appropriate formats subject to the availability of financial resources". (The adopted SB conclusion features compromise language that expands the scope of intersessional work, moving away from the exclusive focus on the JTM originally requested by AG, which was supported by many developing countries.)

The adopted SB conclusion also includes an invitation for "Parties and non-Party stakeholders to submit via the submission portal by 1 September 2026 views on the review of the work programme on the basis of the terms of reference contained in the annex" and the secretariat is tasked "to prepare a report on the views [from the submissions] including proposals for improving the modalities of the JTWP".

Another contentious issue on the scope of the TOR emerged when developed countries suggested that the JTWP review should examine how the JTWP complements the JTM. Developing countries preferred to address the relationship between the two only when Parties deliberate on the operationalisation of the JTM, warning that doing so earlier could pre-judge and derail discussions on both mandates. This issue was resolved with Parties agreeing to the bridging proposal by the Co-

chairs, which reads, [in para 5(h)] "How the review of the work programme could inform or be informed by the process for the operationalization of the just transition mechanism, without prejudice to the mandate set out in para 25 of decision 2/CMA.7".

As for the informal note, para 9 of the adopted SB conclusion reads, "SBSTA and the SBI agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 65, taking note of the informal note prepared by the Co-chairs for these agenda items at these sessions as input, recognizing that the informal note has been prepared by the Co-chairs under their own responsibility and that it does not reflect all views shared and proposals made by Parties, does not represent a basis for further negotiations, is non-exhaustive, includes divergent views, does not prejudice further work or prevent Parties from expressing additional views at any time, as well as the views submitted via the submission portal no later than four weeks prior to SB 65, with a view to recommending a draft decision thereon for consideration at CMA 8".

The informal note was released by the Co-chairs capturing views from Parties on the three buckets of issues on the second last day of the contact group, which contains: (1) Implementation of the JTWP, with a placeholder for messages from the sixth dialogue; (2) Placeholder for the outcome of the review of the JTWP; (3) Process for the operationalisation of the JTM, with a proposed clustering of indicative and non-exhaustive elements of the JTM. There are six clusters of issues in the informal note in this regard: context, purpose, functions, modalities/governance, timelines and link to the JTWP.

With not much time left before the closing plenary, the Co-chairs requested Parties to provide views on whether the overall structure of the informal note is a useful basis for further work without going into the specific details at this stage. These issues remain highly contentious and the real test lies on how they are resolved on the road to and at Antalya.

More details of Parties' interventions are captured below, including the heated exchanges on unilateral measures and climate science.

## CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN THE TOR

**Saudi Arabia** for the **Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** said that, para 24 of decision 2/CMA.7 mandates the synthesis report on the mapping exercise as an input to the JTWP review, and only as an input. It does not mandate the review to assess the relationship between the JTWP and other instruments, initiatives, processes or UN entities, nor to evaluate their complementarity and coherence.

Saudi Arabia also said that the “JTM stands on its own as an issue under our mandate; therefore, the discussion of JTWP and JTM relation should be considered when we deliberate on the JTM development in the upcoming sessions. It is important not to fragment discussions and risk prejudging the outcome of either process. It called for the deletion of paras 5[h] and 5[i] of the first draft of the TOR.

(Para 5(h) in the first draft reads, “The relationship between the JTWP and relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and the PA and relevant entities in the United Nations system, including areas of complementary and coherence, drawing on the synthesis report on the mapping...”; while para 5(i) reads, “Considerations of how the improved modalities of the work programme could inform or be informed by the process for the operationalisation of the JTM”.)

**India** agreed with LMDC adding further that “Since both processes [namely the JTWP review and operationalisation of JTM] are to be conducted together, there is a possibility of inviting Parties to make submissions on how they see the interlinks [between the two] but having it in the TOR can derail the discussion of both mandates and prejudges the discussion. On the mapping exercise, it said, “there is a divergence in the room and we do not consider it as an input to the JTM and so we do not want to see it in the scope [of the TOR].

The **European Union [EU]** proposed that the scope of the TOR for the JTWP review include the functioning of the modalities, quality of outputs, inclusivity of stakeholder engagement, coherence with other relevant instruments, initiatives and processes within the UN system and outside the UN system, and also suggested mapping of the

comprehensive work beyond the UN, including the multilateral development banks (MDBs). It also said that the review should consider how the JTWP complements the JTM and that the “mapping [exercise] is also relevant for the future mechanism” and that the purpose of the review is to assess the JTWP and also facilitate just transition pathways towards 1.5-degree Celsius temperature goal.

The **United Kingdom [UK]** also suggested that the outcome of the review and the operationalisation of the JTM are inherently linked, and so, the TOR should recognise this and avoid duplication. It also called for the TOR to reference para 8 of 2/CMA.7 which is a “specific mandate” for this JTWP “to integrate the outcomes of the first global stocktake (GST1) relevant to just transition in line with the invitation in para 186 of decision 1/CMA.5”.

**New Zealand** also said that the review should include whether resources are used efficiently under the JTWP and consider the extent to which the JTWP ensures coherence with relevant processes, both internal and external to the UNFCCC. **Norway** also suggested that one of the questions that the TOR should address is how the JTWP is included and used by the work by others under the PA; while **Japan** also said that the effectiveness and efficiency of JTWP should be reviewed from the budgetary perspective.

**Ethiopia** for the **Least Developed Countries [LDCs]** noted that it is important to discuss the linkage of JTWP and JTM.

(During the last contact group held morning of 17 June, the Co-chairs proposed a full package, including the draft SB conclusion, revised TOR in annex 1 with bridging proposals on the outstanding issues, as well as the revised informal note with purely editorial edits. In the Co-chairs' revised TOR, the contentious text regarding the relationship between the JTWP and other UN instruments was deleted from the ‘Scope’ [Para 5(h)] and relocated to the ‘Sources of Input’ (para 6(d)). The new para 6(d) reads, “The mapping of relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and the PA and relevant entities in the UN system and the synthesis report to be prepared as requested in paragraph 24 of decision 2/CMA.7, including any areas of

complementarity and coherence to be drawn from it.”)

**Saudi Arabia** for the **LMDC** reiterated its concerns over the specific reference of the TOR in Para 6(d) to include “any areas of coherence and complementarity to be drawn from [the mapping exercise]” and stressed that “this is not part of the mandate”. As a show of compromise, it asked for a “small amendment” to change from “including any areas” to “which may include possible areas” and delete “to be drawn from it”. Saudi Arabia’s proposal was supported by the **Arab Group, Iran and Kuwait**.

**Fiji** for the **Alliance of Small Island States [AOSIS]** said it supported the way forward as proposed by the Co-chairs and for no further changes to the package.

The **UK** rejected Saudi Arabia’s proposal saying that it was “not the time to reopen the text and “there is strong desire to move forward with current package as proposed by the Co-chairs. The **EU** supported the Co-chairs’ proposed way forward but also noted that the relationship on JTWP and JTM were being removed from the scope [of the TOR], [but] in the spirit of compromise, it could move forward and also accepted the proposal made by the Co-chairs on the JTWP and JTM to inform each other, and that one should not prejudge the other. It also said that it could agree with the proposed conclusion with the TOR as the basis for the review of the JTWP.

## VIEWES ON THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE INFORMAL NOTE

**South Africa** for the **AG** said the welcomed the text “in a constructive spirit” and highlighted concerns around the framing and overall architecture of the informal note. It said that the current framing of the text inevitably frontloads the domestic dimensions while the international dimension that speak to the levers around global just transitions are inherently treated as secondary the JTM’s role as a mechanism to enhance international cooperation in supporting nationally determined just transition pathways. “The context, purpose and functions outlined in the text should be reorder to reflect these mandates”, to which the Co-chairs clarified that the order in which the

elements are presented is not intended to suggest a prioritisation of issues.

It also emphasised that the JTM should go beyond helping countries navigate challenges; it must also address existing gaps and enable countries to have equitable access to the economic opportunities emerging from green industrialisation and value chains, etc. It also reiterated that the group “wants to see a constituted body under CMA and report through the SBs” with a “2-tier structure” where there is a “policy tier to provide normative guidance and implementation tier that provides technical support in a practical way”. On the relationship between JTM and JTWP, South Africa said that “the JTM will not sit under the JTWP” and looked forward to further discuss this.

**Chile** for **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean [AILAC]** said it accepted the current non-paper. Commenting on the “modalities/governance”, it highlighted that it should not prejudge the review of the JTWP, especially over the JTM being operationalised under the JTWP. It also proposed that there is a need to avoid any duplication of the JTWP and JTM. It also suggested merging the “integration of just transition considerations into the work of UNFCCC’s constituted bodies and work programmes” and “enhance coordination and coherence” in the functions, given some repetition in both and also expressed its support of having the integration of the relevant outcomes of GST1 in the context and functions of JTM.

**Ethiopia**, for the **LDCs**, said the informal note provided a strong basis for further work and called on Parties to show flexibility in adopting the draft TOR. **Fiji** for **AOSIS** said the current non-paper is a “good basis for COP31.”

**Saudi Arabia**, for the **LMDC** said it “would like to express that the current version of the informal note, particularly with respect to the substantive elements it contains, is not reflective of all of view of Parties.” It also said that “a number of issues were unacceptable”, such as the “mitigation centric approaches” in bucket 1, “the integration of the relevant outcomes of the 1st GST, as this is prescriptive and top down”, “the interlinkages with processes outside our UNFCCC process which is inappropriate” and “the lack of mention on the

support and means of implementation [ MOI] required from developed to developing countries” in bucket 3.

**Qatar** for the **Arab Group** commented that the critical elements of poverty eradication and sustainable development were not captured well in the note and the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) were also not reflected throughout the text”. It said that the text can be forwarded but it is not a basis for negotiation.

**Brazil** also agreed that the non-paper is a good way forward but expressed concerns with the “Modalities/governance” headings. It also supported AILAC’s suggestion to merge the integration of just transition considerations into the work of UNFCCC constituted bodies and work programmes and “enhance coordination and coherence” in the functions

**Colombia** welcomed the integration of just transition into national climate change planning and also into the work of UNFCCC constituted bodies and work programmes under the functions of the JTM. It then suggested adding “provide technical assistance and capacity building to support Parties in integrating just transition to transition away from fossil fuels in the energy system in a just, orderly and equitable manner”. On the relationship between JTM and JTWP, it suggested preserving the JTWP as the political and party-driven platform while the JTM serves as the operational arm that helps translate those into implementation.

**China** sought clarification on the rationale for clustering the issues under the functions of JTM and questioned why the informal note did not draw on the Belem decision, which already contains agreed language setting out the key functions: “enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge sharing and enable equitable, inclusive just transitions”. It also asked why there is no section on “principles” given that this is “important for JTM”. The Co-chair in response said that “technical assistance” and “capacity building” are cross-cutting issues and included in several functions in the informal note.

**Kenya** said it is a useful input but also pointed out

that the agriculture and food systems must account for different national contexts and varying starting points and should not undermine food security, land rights and accessibility to markets. On the “development and implementation of nationally determined just transition pathways” under the JTM bucket, it said that “good to be clear that we are not developing new document”.

**India** said that the way that the agriculture and food systems are reflected in the informal note is a “red line for us”. It highlighted that for a sector primarily driven by smallholders; the country’s immediate priorities lie in adaptation and resilience rather than emissions reduction. It also highlighted that the international and national dimensions in the JTM bucket in the informal note “is not balanced enough”. It said that the informal note “shouldn’t be used as a basis [but] we do not want to lose the progress as it is a compilation of views”.

**Norway** said the note was “a good way to start” but also that it “disagreed with a lot of comments”.

**Japan** said the discussions in Antalya “should be based on this note” but suggested that once the mapping is done, Parties should first discuss the “functions” [of the JTM] to avoid “duplication with existing mechanisms”, while ensuring “effectiveness of efficiency” of the work. It also said it is “extremely important to reflect mitigation and greenhouse gas emissions” in the key messages from the fifth dialogue and proposed adding “Enhancing international cooperation for North-South plurilateral partnership” and also include the words “South-South” based on the initial output of the mapping exercise.

The **UK** said it the informal note provides “a good basis” stressed the need for “reference to the agriculture emissions” as it is the “core of the goal of the mandate” and also mentioned “transitioning away from fossil fuels in the agricultural fuel system”, adding further on the need to “take forward the mandate of integrating GST” in the implementation of JTWP. It had concerns regarding MOI, saying that “we do feel it needs to be pragmatic and specific on what JT can do”.

**Canada** said the informal note was a helpful tool to visualize all the options and highlighted that the current framing on international cooperation is

rather “narrow” and “does not necessarily reflect the wide spectrum” of international cooperation.

The **EU** said that the key messages from the fifth dialogue are not balanced given the “lack of reference to mitigation, energy transition...transition away from fossil fuel in a just, orderly and equitable manner... and in reducing emissions from the food system”. Responding to China’s question on the “principles”, the EU argued that a separate section on principles is unnecessary, since a common understanding of a just transition is already provided by the dialogues’ key messages. On the “governance and modalities”, it said the JTM should be fit for purpose and connected to the functions.

**Switzerland**, for the **Environmental Integrity Group [EIG]** said it was willing to engage on the informal note, but it also had concerns.

Many other Parties provided substantial inputs on the specific elements in the informal note, to which the Co-chairs invited Parties to use the intersessional work to mobilise support for their proposal and for further discussion among Parties.

## HEATED EXCHANGES ON UNILATERAL MEASURES AND CLIMATE SCIENCE

**Egypt for G77 and China** said that one of the high-level messages from the fifth dialogue was the “Negative impacts of unilateral trade measures on food production and food security; Climate related unilateral trade measures (UTMs), including carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM) which risks imposing additional burdens on developing countries, undermining their food security, livelihoods, and ability to pursue nationally determined just transitions. These measures can restrict market access, increase compliance costs, raise fertilizers and food prices and exacerbate structural inequities.”

Responding to the call by other developing countries to include key messages on unilateral measures (UMs), the **EU** defended its CBAM policy by saying that a “vast majority are domestic policies and nationally determined by nature” and the policy measure to address “carbon leakage from the emission-intensive sectors”. It also said that that “EU’s legally binding targets is 55%

reduction in 2030 and no net emissions by 2050 by preventing carbon leakage in carbon intensive [industries]”. It also drew attention to the para 57 of the ‘Global Mutirao’ decision that the climate and trade dialogue is the “main political forum for the discussion on climate and trade”.

Further, EU also said that “UNFCCC and PA are not designed to assess nationally determined policy and has no mandate” to do so, asserting that “international validation of [Parties’] response measure is outside of the scope” and “it is unacceptable [to discuss] EU policies or any other Parties’ policies”. It then said that “cross border impact is being discussed under KCI [Katowice Committee on Response Measures] since decades and that remain the relevant space. It also warned against treating these policies “prejudicially as unilateral measures nor trade restrictive measures” and insisted that they are “climate measures, not trade measures”.

**China** responded by saying that the “CBAM is not a domestic measure as it does not just target domestic players but also international players”. It said further that it did not understand the logic of a country’s measure which is already in implementation and already has an impact on other countries but is not allowed for international community to discuss it. It said that it supports global free trade to facilitate renewable energy deployments around the world and that while these unilateral measures [UMs] claim to tackle carbon leakage, they are essentially a trade protectionism which would disrupt global supply chain and are against the principle of CBDR and that JT should be people-centered, inclusive and nationally-determined. It said that countries have different economic structures and when the UMs apply a one size fits all approach, it will fail. Lastly, it stressed that trade barriers will make it harder for food security and just transitions can only be achieved through multilateral collaboration; hence there is a need to assess and address the adverse impact of UMs to ensure a fair global environment for trade.

The **UK** said not to expand the scope of discussion with regards to trade as Parties have agreed that trade will be discussed in the climate and trade dialogue. Further, it said that “with regards to science, we underline that science is non-

negotiable. The IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] findings, though not comfortable for certain Parties...it is precisely why they need guide climate action...Misinformation is not a side issue. It undermines trust in science and delaying action”.

(The UK’s intervention, which was echoed by others including **Japan, Colombia, New Zealand** on climate science was in response to India’s intervention global carbon budget and fair shares and the equity assessment of the scenarios assessed in IPCC 6th Assessment Report [AR6]. For further information on India’s intervention, please see [TWN Update 5](#); while for more information on the climate and trade dialogue, please see [TWN Update 8](#))

On climate science, **India** responded by saying that, “We are in an era where there is much misinformation about science, and regions where climate change denial is substantial. In India we are fortunate to not be affected by this phenomenon of climate change denial.”

“This is because we understand that science is an everyday aspect of our work and interactions. It must in fact constantly be discussed and debated. Debate and skepticism are hallmarks of scientific inquiry. Taking some statements and reports as a given without engaging with the substance of what they say, would be a poor reflection indeed, and not in keeping with the very reason why we have had such great scientific advance over the years,” said India.

Elaborating further, India said, “That being said, we would also underline that cherry picking elements of some reports are not in keeping with the scientific method. It is, in fact, the very IPCC reports that are being cited, that signal clearly, that even a 50% probability of limiting warming global warming to 1.5 degree Celsius, implies limiting cumulative emissions to about 3000 billion tonnes. 2500 billion tonnes have already been emitted by 2020 itself – largely by developed countries, leaving a carbon budget of 500 billion tonnes from 2020 onwards for the entire world till emissions reach net zero. We must also mention 500 billion tonnes is almost exactly equal to what the Annex-I countries have emitted just from 1990 onwards till 2020 – even after agreeing to take the lead under

the Convention.”

“We are very happy that we are having these scientific discussions here. But as we said yesterday, a serious engagement with science requires debate, discussion, and balance. Science cannot simply be a slogan to be used as convenient,” it said further.

**Saudi Arabia** for **LMDC** said that, “‘science’ is not science if underlying assumptions are not discussed and debated vigorously as is scientific practice, it becomes either speculation or political justification, especially when most outputs are produced by experts from developed countries and therefore cannot reflect a truly global and objective situation, including that of developing countries.” Some of the key messages highlighted by Saudi Arabia includes: “Highlight the need to ensure that barriers to development are addressed, as this is not just a matter on trade but also a matter that hinders progress of developing countries in their development pathways which is closely linked to just transitions, this includes opposing climate-related unilateral trade measures [UTMs],...which have a global restrictive impact particularly on developing countries and highlight distortive domestic subsidy packages in developed country Parties create unfair global trade conditions that disadvantage food producers in developing country Parties and should be phased out.”

Elaborating further, it said, “UTMs have a significant impact on the value chain of fertilizers, as a key example; which would in turn cascade onto agricultural production rates as well as affordability and overall food security. CBAM has a great negative impact for food security and raises global prices. Fertilizers are critical because they directly affect how much food can be produced from existing farmland....and disruptions or constraints in their supply or affordability can quickly translate into lower yields, higher food prices, and increased food insecurity – contributing to the absolute opposite of sustainable development and eradication of poverty – the very mandate of just transitions.”

“Article 3, paragraph 5, of the Convention, which predates the Paris Agreement and is not subject to any no-mandate argument, establishes that Parties ‘should cooperate to promote a supportive and

open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade', said Saudi Arabia further.

Explaining further, it said, "What we are witnessing is a form of reverse MOI. Instead of enabling developing countries through finance, technology, and capacity building, resources are effectively being extracted from them, reinforcing existing inequalities. Some developed countries doubled down and expanded unilateral trade-restrictive climate-related measures. In an interesting turn of events, finance is now flowing from developing countries to developed countries." It said further that "The reframing of unilateral trade measures as being positive is not acceptable and we disagree with the notion that these approaches are to address "carbon leakage".

#### INTERSESSIONAL WORK BETWEEN BONN AND ANTALYA

During the final contact group on 17 June, **Ghana** for the **AG** proposed to "include additional space during the sixth dialogue to discuss the process for the operationalisation of the JTM", in the hope to advance the discussion before Antalya. The AG's proposal was supported by **Botswana** for the **Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs)**, **Nigeria**, and **South Africa**.

**Brazil** noted that there was a space secure during

the fifth dialogue and so did not see why a space could not be secured during the sixth dialogue", adding further that there will be no budgetary implication if it is part of the dialogue. Brazil's points were also echoed by **China** and the **AILAC**. **Egypt** also noted that this could be part of the 6<sup>th</sup> dialogue which would not incur additional budgetary implications.

The **EU** said "we do have a topic defined for the sixth dialogue and we will need a time to discuss this. [It is a] technical dialogue and so that's not the right space [to discuss the JTM]. We potentially see a space for submissions on this, or virtual meetings as done before but this is not an option for us." It also said that the dialogues are meant for technical issues on how to accelerate the implementation of just transitions and they are more for the experts from national levels, and hence they may not be the same people coming to the dialogue.

**Norway** said the AG's proposal of having additional space "would require some sort of arrangement or support adding further that "if we mandate a workshop, then we need to invite all Parties and there will be budgetary implications and a surge in cost...clearly there is no UNFCCC budget for additional activities."

The **UK** came back with another proposal to add a para 6bis that "The SBSTA and SBI considered the possible interlinkage between the implementation of JTWP and JTM" to better reflect the discussion Parties had in Bonn.

This was then rebutted by **Saudi Arabia**, saying it was not sure if Parties did consider the interlinkages between JTWP and JTM in Bonn. **Japan** said any intersessional workshop should "take into account the budgetary implications".